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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE-REFORMS AND TRENDS IN
WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE
Mauro Cappelletti*
s there any contribution that a European student of comparative
law and procedure can make to the study of procedural reforms
in the United States?
Clearly, the answer to this question cannot come from me. You
will have to judge for yourself whether or not the continental problems of which ,I shall speak in this lecture are similar enough to the
problems in your country to deserve your attention; whether or not
the European solutions, as well as the trends, needs, and designs of
reform, may offer any suggestions to Americans.
It is my intention first to analyze the reforms accomplished in
Europe in the relatively recent past. I shall then turn to the principal
current problems and trends of reform. Finally, I will reflect on the
intellectual and socio-political background of such reforms, problems, and trends. This approach will also give us the opportunity to
discuss what kind of scholarship in the field of civil procedure is
demanded today, at least in Europe but probably elsewhere as well,
in order to meet the changed needs of our time.

I

I. A

LOOK AT THE PAST

The most varied systems of civil procedure have been in force at
one time or another in continental Europe.1 I shall not go back to
the ancient ones. I am concerned here only with those types that still
exercise some influence-for better or for worse--on the Continent.
We must begin with the late Middle Ages and the jus commune
procedure, the "common" procedure of Europe, adopted by the
ecclesiastical and imperial courts; defined and refined by the learned
doctores at the School of Bologna and all of the other Schools in Italy
and elsewhere which followed the Bolognese model; influencing, and
yet in turn influenced by, the statutory developments of the free
city-states, the principalities, and other sovereignties; "received" as
• Professor of Law, University of Florence (Italy) and Stanford University; Director of the Institute of Comparative Law, University of Florence; Visiting Professor,
Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley, 1970-1971; D. jur. 1952 University of
Florence.-Ed.
1. See A. ENGELMANN et al., A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CML PROCEDURE (R.
Millar ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1927) [hereinafter ENGELMANN]; M. CAPPELLE'IT.I &:
J. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 25-46 (The Hague: Nijhoff. 1965).
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the regular, general type of procedure by most of the Continent during the last centuries of the Middle Ages, and still the prevailing
procedural norm on the eve of the French Revolution and beyond.2
Subject to many variations-particularly noteworthy were those
in France3-the jus commune procedure had certain unique characteristics. First, it attributed absolute predominance, indeed a real
monopoly, to the written element. "Quod non est in actis non est in
mundo": procedural acts not reduced to writing were null and void;
and a judgment based on elements other than written ones was itself
null and void.4
Second, it discouraged any personal, direct, open contact between
the adjudicating body and the parties, the witnesses, the experts, or
other sources of information such as places and things. The judge
was required to base his decision exclusively upon the written record,
not his personal impressions. Why not, then, entrust the preparation
of the record to persons other than the judge? Thus, the actuarii,
the notarii, and others-not the judge-examined the witnesses in
camera and translated into written language--often Latin-the witnesses' spoken words. The court only met with the papers-at the
end of the proceeding. 5 Hence, a wall existed between the judge,
usually a doctor and as such a representative of a small ruling segment of society, and the other persons involved in a civil litigation,
particularly the parties and witnesses. With that wall came the insulation of the judge from the facts and, of course, from the people
as well.
Third, the jus commune civil procedure was characterized by the
so-called "formal" or "legal" system of proof. The evaluation of
evidence was mathematically established by law. One witness was
no proof at all-testis unus testis nullus6-:with but one exception,
2, See, e.g., Engelmann, The Romano-Canonical Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra
note I, at 417-504; Engelmann et al., Modern Continental Procedure, in ENGELMANN,
at 507-86, 645-46, 783-84; Chiovenda, Roman and Germanic Elements in Continental
Civil Procedure, in ENGELMANN, at 875-914.
3. See I G. CHIOVENDA, !STITUZIONI DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CMLE 101-02, 130-32
(Napoli: Jovene. 2d ed. 1935); Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, in
ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 51. Cf. Engelmann et al., Modern Continental Procedure,
in ENGELMANN at 645-782.
4. The literature in this field is immense. See, e.g., M. CAFPELLETII, Procedure orale et
procedure t!crite 42-43 (Milano: Giuffre. 1971); Engelmann, The Romano-Canonical
Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 457-58.
5. See, e.g., 1 G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 127-28; Millar, supra note ll, at 64.
6. See, e.g., 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 242-43 (Boston: Little, Brown. lld ed. 1940);
Millar, supra note 3, at 44. The rule was still uncritically asserted by Pothier on the
eve of the French Revolution. Traitt! des obligations, in 1 OEUVRES de R.-J. POTHIER
§ 818, at 246 (Bruxelles: Jonker, Ode, et Woden. 1829). See the criticism of Pothier by
E. BONNIER, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES PREUVES EN DROIT CIVIL ET EN DROIT
CRIMlNEL § 293, at 264 (Paris: Plon 8: Marescq. 5th ed. 1888).
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the Pope.7 Testimony of two uncontradicted witnesses8 or, if they
were hearsay witnesses (testes de auditu), of five or seven of them,9
was full evidence binding on the court. The testimony of women,
no matter how many they were, was either inadmissible or counted
only as one half of the evidence and had to be supplemented by the
testimony of at least one man.10 In the hierarchy of testimonial values the nobleman ranked above the commoner, the clergyman
above the layman, the rich above the poor, the old above the young,
the Christian above the Jew.11 All proof was legally predetermined
in arithmetical proportions: full proof (plena probatio), half (semiplena), one-fourth, one-eighth, and so on.12 The judge had to count
proof, not weigh it-an understandable system considering that the
judge did not see the witnesses, did not observe their behavior, and
could not appreciate their sincerity or malice. The law, then, did
the job for him-of course, in an abstract and a priori way. Number, sex, age, social and economic status, religion-these were the
elements that made the "truth," not honesty and good faith ascertained and appreciated in the concrete case.13
7. This exception is affirmed, for instance, by a famous author of the sixteenth
century, J. Cujacius, in his comment to the Decretales Gregorii IX, lib. II, tit. XX De
testibus et attestationibus, cap. XXVII. See J. CuJAcms, ToMus SEXTUS OPERUM
POSTUMORUM 859 (Napoli: Mutio. 1722).
8. See, e.g., Engelmann, The Romano-Canonical Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra
note 1, at 480; Millar, supra note 3, at 44. With variations from place to place and
from time to time, the proof of certain facts required testimony of a higher number
of witnesses. For example, twelve or perhaps forty-four witnesses were required
against a cardinal, 7 J. ,v1GMORE, supra note 6, at 242, and eight or sixteen• commoners
(burgenses) were needed to prevail over a count or a baron. 2 G. SALVIOLI, STORIA DELLA
PROCEDURA CIVILE E CRIMINALE 429 (Milano: Hoepli. 1927).
9. See 1 M. CAPPELLETTI, LA TESTIMONIANZA DELLA
138-39 n.18 (Milano: Giuffre. 1962).

PARTE

NEL SISTEMA DELL'ORALITA

10. See 2 G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 430-31. Cf. 2 E. GLASSON &: A. TISSIER, TRAITE
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANISATION JUDICIAITRE, DE COMPETENCE ET DE PROCEDURE
c1v1LE 779 n.1 (Paris: Sirey. 3d ed. 1926); R. MOREL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE PROCEDURE
CIVILE 378 (Paris: Sirey. 2d ed. 1949). See note 149 infra.
11. See references in M. CAPPELLETil &: J. PERILLO, supra note 1, at 35 n.140; 2
G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 427. Damasus in the thirteenth century summarized the
requisites of a witness in the following couplet: "Conditio, sexus, aetas, discretio, fama
Et fortuna, fides; in testibus ista requiras." DIE "SUMMA DE ORDINE JUDICIARIO" DES
MAGIST.ER DAMASUs 43 (L. Wahrmund ed. Aalen: Scientia. Reprint 1962). The hierarchy
of testimonial values was even more strongly enunciated in a famous work written
about 1200, probably by the Glossator Pillius of Medicina: DER ORDo "INVOCATO
CHRISTI NOMINE" 115 (L. Wahrmund ed. Aalen: Scientia. Reprint 1962) (" ••• ut potius
sit credendum • • • seniori quam iuniori, honorato quam inferiori, masculo quam
femine •••• Item potius • • • nobili quam ignobili •••• Item magis diviti quam
pauperi').
12. See, e.g.,

7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 241.

13. See note 11 supra; note 149 infra and accompanying text.
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A fourth feature of jus commune procedure was its segmental,
piecemeal unfolding. Since the judge did not intervene and direct
the proceedings, the parties or, rather, their attorneys, were the
uncontrolled masters of the conduct of the case. Hence, abuses, dilatory tactics, and postponements were the usual plague.14 To cope
with these abuses, the law tried to impose order by prescribing a
series of compulsory and peremptory stages-a thirteenth century
treatise enumerated eighteen of them in the ordinary case15-thus
aggravating the already rigid and abstract character of procedural
segmentation. The dilution of civil proceedings was further aggravated by the fact that separate appeals had to be taken immediately
from any kind of judicial decision at the risk of waiver-even from
a partial or interlocutory decision, or one admitting or refusing evidence. Thus, the principal case was frequently suspended.16 Moreover, new evidence and facts were not infrequently admissible in
the courts of second instance-one more encouragement for appeals.17 The usual course of a litigation, then, was a proliferation of
derivative appellate proceedings, spreading outward like the numerous branches of a big tree.
The fifth and last characteristic of the procedure was the natural
consequence of all the others: the enormously long duration of a
civil case. Civil proceedings lasting for several decades were not
unusual.1 8
14. Under the older continental systems those principles which left the parties
free to take or not to take a given step in the cause, to utilize or not to utilize any
material relevant to the decision, to forward or to delay the progress of the cause,
and rendered the court a purely passive instrumentality • • • , prevailed in a
much more rigorous fashion than they ever did in our own [United States]
system.
Millar, Civil Procedure Reform in Civil Law Countries, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELDCENTENARY EssAYS 120, 130 (A. Reppy ed. New York: N.Y.U. School of Law. 1949).
15. 1 G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 128-29.
16. See I G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 121-22; Engelmann et al., Modern Con•
tinental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 589 (in discussing the German and
Austrian procedure in the period before the codification of the nineteenth century,
the authors write that "too many modes of attack upon judgment were permitted. As a
result even simple causes remained pending indefinitely').
17. Cf. H. BRIEGLEB, EINLEITUNG IN DIE THEORIE DER SUMMARISCHEN PROCESSE 85-95
(Leipzig: Tauchnitz. 1859); G. WETZELL, SYSTEM DES ORDENTLICHEN CMLPROCESSFS 758-57
(Leipzig: Tauchnitz. 3d ed. 1878).
18. See, e.g., E. KERN, GESCHICHTE DES GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHTS 31, 45-46 (Miinchen:
Beck. 1954); A. TROLLER, VON DEN GRUNDLAGEN DES ZMLPROZESSUALEN FORMALISMUS 85-86
(Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn. 1945) (' • •• proceedings lived longer than the parties
and were inherited from generation to generation'); Engelmann et al., Modern Continental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 588 ("••• all this dragged out the
cause to interminable lengths'); Vollkommer, Die Zange Dauer der Zivilprozesse und
ihre Ursachen, 81 ZEITSCHRIFT FiiR ZIVILPROZESS 102, 121-23 (1968) (' • •• proceedings last•
ing thirty years or more were not uncommon'). See also H.-G. KIP, DAS SOGENANNTE
MiiNDUCHKEITSPRINZIP 25 (Koln: Heymanns. 1952).
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THE ERA OF REFORM

This, then, was still the situation on the Continent on the eve of
the French Revolution, somewhat improved here or there,19 yet further corrupted by other features of that era, such as: (1) the multiplicity of jurisdictions-royal, feudal, ecclesiastical, and so forthbased on the typical privileges and the nonegalitarian structure of
the ancien regime society; 20 and (2) the patrimonial, venal character
of the administration of justice, which particularly in France was
not a public service in the modern sense but rather a property right
of the judges, who had either inherited or bought the judgeship
and who had to be paid for their services by the parties.21
The dismantling of such a system was commenced, but not
achieved, by the French Revolution. After 1789, the sale and inheritance of judicial offices were forbidden. A loi of August 16-24,
1790, abolished the privileged jurisdictions as being in conflict with
the revolutionary idea of egalite in the new bourgeois state.22 The
same loi proclaimed the gratuitous character of the judicial function (gratuite de la justice), with the new judges compensated not by
the parties but by the state.23 The loi of 7 Fructidor of the Year III
(1795) further abolished the secret character of the taking of testimonial evidence (Principe du secret de l' enquete), establishing instead that the witnesses had to be heard at the public hearing in the
19. All over Europe, summary types of procedure were developed in order to attenuate the formalism of the ordinary jus commune procedure. See generally, e.g.,
H. BruEGLEB, supra note 17.
20. See, e.g., 1 G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 132, 134; 1 M. RoussELET, HISTOIRE DE
LA MAGISTRATURE FRANyAISE 4-19 and passim (Paris: Plon. 1957). In particular for
Germany, see E."DoHRING, GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSPFLEGE SEIT 1500, 8-14, 19,
71 (Berlin: Duncker 8e Humblot. 1953); E. KERN, supra note 18, at 78, 105, 151. For
Italy, see 2 G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 74-137.
21. See, e.g., 1 G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 132, 134; J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF
THE LAW 350-62 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Law School. 1968); P. HERZOG,
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 45 n.132 (The Hague: Nijhoff. 1967): 1 M. RoussELET,
supra note 20, at 92-100; 2 M. RoussELET, supra note 20, at 227-34. For the description
of a similar, but less extreme and widespread, situation in Germany, Spain, Holland,
and Italy, see, e.g., J. DAWSON, supra, at 247-48; E. DOHRING, supra note 20, at 52-53, 55,
75-88, 96-105; 2 G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 738-39. The fee system was not a characteristic of the Civil-Law orbit alone. For England and the United States, see 1 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 254 (London: Methuen 8e Sweet and Maxwell.
7th ed. 1956, reprinted 1966); 5 R. PouND, JURISPRUDENCE 669-71 (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing. 1959). See also J. DAWSON, supra, at 352-53.
22. Law of August 16-24, 1790 (tit. II, art. 16). See, e.g., P. CATALA 8e F. TERRE,
PROCEDURE CIVILE ET VOIES D'EXECUTION 18 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1965); I G. CmovENDA, supra note 3, at 134. On the abolition of the venal character of
judicial offices in 1789 see, e.g., J. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 375-76; 1 M. RousSELET,
supra note 20, at 116, 123.
23. Law of August 16-24, 1790 (tit. Il, art. 11). See, e.g., P. CATALA 8e F. TERRE, supra
note 22, at 19.
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presence of the parties.24 Finally, the "formal system of proof" was
radically attacked by the French reformers and the new concept of
free judicial evaluation of evidence affirmed, although many archaic
relics of the previous system outlived the revolutionary storm.26
Most, but not all of these radical changes were adopted by the
Napoleonic codes. Significantly, the code de procedure civile of 1806
returned in part to the secrecy of testimonial proof-taking. Under
this code, testimonial evidence no longer was taken by the adjudicating court at a public hearing, but was to be taken by a juge-commissaire, in the presence of the parties but not of the general public.26
Thus, as lamented by French authors, since the judge-commissioner
had to write down the witnesses' depositions, and since he would
not be the adjudicating judge, the latter would only have before him
a piece of paper, without physiognomy.27
But the reform movement, at last unchained, could not forever
be so confined. It was in fact the natural outgrowth, as will be further
seen, of the needs of a new liberal, bourgeois society, of the new
intellectual and economic fabric of nineteenth and early twentieth
century Europe. Thus, it would be improper to reduce the history
of such a movement to recounting the individual accomplishments of
"great" personalities. Yet, at least in the field of law and legal reform,
individual greatness has meant, above all, a greater capacity to
interpret the new general needs and new social demands, and to
provide appropriate solutions to the new ideological and political
problems. The "science" of procedure in the opening period of the
reform movement is identified with men who showed that capacity.
The long list includes Pagano in Italy, Bellot in Switzerland, Feuerbach and Mittermaier in Germany, and, above all, Jeremy Bentham,
with his sharp, brutal, cutting critique of the past-an outsider,
yet fully introduced into the Continent by a famous and early translation into French of his legal ·writings.28 P.F. Bellot openly recog24. See, e.g., E. BONNIER, supra note 6, § 248, at 225-26; M. CAl'PELLEITI, supra note
4, at 43-44 n.87; 2 E. GLASSON &: A. TrssIER, supra note 10, at 781.
25. See, e.g., Engelmann et al., Modem Continental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra
note 1, at 758; Millar, supra note 3, at 45-46.
26. See, e.g., Engelmann et al., Modern Continental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra
note 1, at 760.
27. See, e.g., E. BONNIER, ELEMENTS DE PROCEDURE CIVILE 230, 241, 243-44 (Paris: Pion.
1853); 2 E. GLASSON &: A. TISSIER, supra note 10, at 781; R. MoREL, supra note 10, at 392.
28. E. Dumont translated Bentham's works into French. He published the first three
volumes of his translations in Paris in 1802. See Dumont, Preface to 2 OEUVRES DE J.
BENTHAM (E. Dumont transl. Bruxelles: Hauman et Co. 1829). Much of Bentham's
legal writings were first published in French; their influence on the Continent was
very significant. See Millar, supra note 14, at 1!17.
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nized Bentham's influence in the preface to his code de procedure
civile of Geneva of 1819: "I owe to the friendship of Monsieur Dumont my acquaintance with the . . . manuscripts, as yet unpublished, of Bentham on procedure; I wish to recognize that they have
often proved useful in the course of my work." 29
You may know more than I about the revolution in the field of
civil procedure that, mostly under the pressure of Benthamite criticism, was soon to occur in England and in this country as well.
Indeed, it was a very understandable revolution. Procedure in equity
was very much akin to the jus commune procedure, some characteristics of which we have already examined: predominance of writing, 30
secret taking of evidence by examiners or commissioners,31 numerical
evaluation of testimonial evidence,32 and incredible delay. 33 But
procedure at law was not much better. There, too, the course of a
civil litigation was stifled by formalism and technicalities, with the
jury insulated from the facts by a long list of a priori, abstract disqualifications and exclusions. For instance, the parties, any third
person interested in any way in the case, persons convicted of crimes,
and others were not allowed to testify.34
On the Continent, the great reform movement presented itself
under an overarching and yet too often misleading symbolic name:
"orality." What it meant, however, was much more than a mere
reaction against the prevalence of writing in the jus commune
29. Quoted in E. SCHURTER & H. FRITZSCHE, DIE GESCHICHTLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER
KANTONALEN RECHTE 20 (Ziirich: Rascher. 1931). For an analysis and evaluation of
Bellot's legislative work see id. at 16-48.
30. See 9
HoLDSWORTII, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 337, 353-58 (London: Methuen
& Sweet and Maxwell. 3d ed. 1944, reprinted 1966); A. JoHNES, SUGGESTIONS FOR A
REFORM OF 'IHE COURT OF CHANCERY BY A UNION OF TIIE JURISDICTIONS OF EQUITY AND
LAW iii, 85-103 (London: Saunders & Benning. 1834); R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 25, 36-37 (New York: The Law Center of
New York University, 1952); Yale, Introduction to LoRD NornNGHAM's "'MANUAL OF
CHANCERY PRACTICE' AND 'PROLEGOMENA OF CHANCERY AND EQUITY'" 58 (D. Yale ed.
Cambridge: University Press. 1965).
31. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 337, 353-58; R. MILLAR, supra note 30,
at 25, 36-37; Yale, supra note 30, at 59-61.
32. See R. GRESLEY, A TREATISE ON TIIE LAw OF EVIDENCE 4 (London: Saunders &
Benning. 1836) ("••• the courts of equity followed the maxim of the civil law, responsio
unius non omnino audiatur, and required the evidence of two witnesses as the foundation for a decree"); 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 15-16; 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6,
at 290-94. Only some of the many jus commune rules of numerical evaluation of
evidence were adopted by the courts of equity, most notably the rule that the
testimony of only one witness was not sufficient. See, e.g., 7 J. WIGMORE, supra, at 254;
Millar, supra note 3, at 49.
33. See, e.g., 9 W. HOLDSWORTII, supra note 30, at 356, 358-71; Yale, supra note 30,
at 58, 61-65.
34. See, e.g., 9 W. HOLDSWORTII, supra note 30, at 189-97; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note
6, at 602-32, 674-753.
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and derivative proceedings. It meant a reaction against, and a radical
break with, all those characteristics of the jus commune that we mentioned before. Thus, in addition to a revaluation of the oral element
in procedure, the leading ideals of the reform movement were the
following: first, "immediacy"-that is, a direct, personal, open relationship between the adjudicating organ and the parties, the witnesses, and the other sources of proof; second, "free" or, more
precisely, "critical" evaluation of evidence, unfettered by a priori
rules of exclusion or evaluation, and based on the direct observation
of the evidentiary elements by the judge in open court; third, "concentration" of the case in a single hearing or in a few closely spaced
oral sessions before the court, carefully prepared through a preliminary stage in which writings were not necessarily to be excluded;
finally, and as a consequence of the first three ideals, a more rapid
unfolding of the litigation.
These were the openly declared goals of the most progressive
critiques, proposals, and legislative reforms throughout the nineteenth century in Europe; and these have continued to be the goals
of reformers deep into our century.35 The two landmarks of the
movement36 were the German Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 and
the extremely influential, more radically innovative Austrian Code
of 1895.37 The major innovation of the Austrian Code was its emphasis on a more active role for the judge both in expediting the
proceeding and in promoting the social aim of effective equality of
the parties. The crucial institution for this role was the personal,
"oral" contact of the judge with the litigants, assisted but not substituted by their counsel.38
35. For more details and references see M. CAPPELLETII, supra note 4, at 41-59, 89-92.
36. In this context, the Code of Civil Procedure of Hanover of 1850 and the
Austrian law on small claims procedure (Bagatellverfahren) of 1873 also deserve to
be mentioned. On the Code of Hanover see, e.g., 1 A. 'WACH, HANDBUCH DES DEursCHEN
CIVILPROZESSRECHTS 138-41 (Leipzig: Duncker 8e Humblot. 1885); Engelmann et al.,
Modern Continental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 598-99. On the
Austrian Bagatellverfahren see, e.g., F. KLEIN 8e F. ENGEL, DER ZIVILPROZESS OESTER·
REICHS 40-41 (Mannheim: Bensheimer. 1927); Engelmann et al., supra, at 633.
37. The German Zivilprozessordnung of January 30, 1877 has been in force since
October 1, 1879, with a number of significant amendments. The Austrian Zivilprozessordnung of August 1, 1895 has been in force since January 1, 1898.
38. Sections 182 and 183 of the Austrian Code contain the essential provisions
concerning the social aspect of the judge's active role; they give the judge the power
and duty to promote a decision based on a complete analysis of the merits of the case.
To this end, he must advise the parties of any procedural error or incompleteness in
their presentation of the facts. He may on his own motion call the parties to appear
personally before him, order the production of documents, call witnesses, and order
expert testimony. See notes 54 8e 135 infra and accompanying text. Sections 182 and
183 were adopted almost literally in a series of amendments to the German Code in
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These two landmarks were followed by a number of further
statutory developments, all of which were more or less modeled on
the first two. They included the Hungarian Code of 1911,39 the
Norwegian Code of 1915,40 the Danish Code of 1916,41 the 1929 Code
of Yugoslavia,42 the 1933 Code of Poland,43 the 1942 Code of
Sweden,44 and the Swiss federal law of civil procedure of 1947.45

III. THE

!MPAGr OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT ON DELAY

The natural question at this point is: what was the practical
impact of such a large reform movement in Continental Europe? I
have chosen for examination only one of the typical features of the
1909, 1924, and 1933. See German Zivilprozessordnung § 139; Baur, Zeit• und Geistes•
striimungen im Prozess, 92 JURISTISCHE BLATTER 445, 446 (1970).
The judge's powers to speed up the proceeding are provided for in other sections
of the Austrian Code, such as §§ 87 and 179. These powers also served as a model for
the German reforms. See German Zivilprozessordnung §§ 261b and 279a; Habscheid,
Richtermacht oder Parteifreiheit, 81 ZEITSCHRIFl' FUR ZIVILPROZESS 175, 180 (1968).
On the extraordinary influence of the Austrian Code upon the legislation of
various countries, see, e.g., Satter, Das Werk Franz Kleins und sein Einfluss auf die
neueren Prozessgesetze, 60 ZEITSCHRIFl' FUR DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESS 272 (1936-37);
Schima, Der Einfluss der iisterreichischen ]ustizgesetze auf das europiiische Ausland, in
.ALMANACH DER STADT WIEN 1960, at 80-89.
39. The Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure of 1911 was the valuable work of
A. Pl6sz, Like the Austrian Code of 1895, it was inspired by the ideals of orality, immediacy, concentration, and free evaluation of evidence. See, e.g., Fabinyi, Das ungarische Prozessrecht, in DER ZIVILPROZESS IN DEN EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND !HREN
KoLONIEN 265, 267, 279-82 (F. Leske&: W. Loewenfeld eds. Berlin: Heymanns. 2d ed.
1933).
40. The Code of Civil Procedure of Norway, enacted in 1915 but in force only since
1927, was also modeled after the codes of Austria and Germany. See Alten, Das Zivilprozessrecht in Norwegen, in DER ZIVILPROZESS IN DEN EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND !HREN
KoLONIEN, supra note 39, at 483, 484.
41. The Danish Code of Civil Procedure of 1916, in force since 1919, also adopted
the criteria of orality, immediacy, and free evaluation of evidence; it was strongly influenced by the Austrian model. See, e.g., H. MUNCH-PETERSEN, DER ZIVILPROZESS DANE•
MARKS 50-58, 78-81 (Mannheim: Bensheimer. 1932).
42, The Yugoslav Code of Civil Procedure of 1929 was almost a literal copy of the
Austrian code. See Peritch, Anhang: Die auf dem Gebiete der Gerichtsorganisation und
des Zivilprozesses fur ganz ]ugoslavien gemeinsamen Gesetze, in DER ZIVILPROZESS IN DEN
EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND IHREN KOLONIEN, supra note 39, at 619, 625 n.18.
43. The Polish Code of Civil Procedure of 1933 was also inspired by the same
principles. See, e.g., R. KANN, DIE POLNISCHE ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 98 (Berlin: Heymanns, 1933); Stelmachowski, Das Zivilprozessrecht in Polen, in DER ZIVILPROZESS
IN DEN EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND !HREN KOLONIEN, supra note 39, at 695, 705-06.
44. The principal goal of the Swedish Code of Procedure of 1942, in force since
1948, was to establish a procedure based on the criteria of orality and related principles.
See, e.g., Simson, Das neue schwedische Zivilprozessrecht, 63 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SCHWEIZER·
ISCHES R.EcHT 122, 139-41 (1944). On the similarities of the Swedish Code and the
Austrian Code, see Welamson, 6sterreichisches und schwedisches Zivilprozessrecht, 9
ZEITSCHRIFl' FUR R.ECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 214, 217-18, 223 (1968).
45. See generally M. GULDENER, SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 56, 453-58 (Ziirich:
Schulthess. 2d ed. 1958).
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pre-reform procedure, a feature that, however, was the natural consequence of all the others: delay-enormous, unbearable delay.
Judicial statistics in those countries where the reform movement
has been consistently implemented are extremely eloquent. Toward
the end of the nineteenth century a prominent German proceduralist, Adolf Wach, praised the success of the German Code of
1877 on the basis of the following figures: in the higher courts of first
instance, the Landgerichte, twenty-seven per cent of all civil litigation was terminated within three months after the commencement
of the case, another 28.7 per cent within three to six months, and still
another 28.7 per cent within six months to one year; in the lower
courts of first instance, the Amtsgerichte, 63.5 per cent of the contentious civil proceedings were decided in less than three months and
another 22.8 per cent were decided within three to six months.46
The situation has not deteriorated in recent times. In a typical
year, 1968, more than sixty per cent of the contentious civil proceedings in the Landgerichte and more than eighty per cent in the
Amtsgerichte were terminated in less than six months.47
Notwithstanding this impressive record, our German brethren
still often complain about the excessive duration of civil litigation in
their country.48 Indeed, they have at least two main reasons to com46. A. Vv ACH, DIE MiiNDLICHKEIT IN DEM ENTWURF DER OSTERREICHISCHEN CIVILPROCESS·
ORDNUNG 21, 60 (Leipzig: Edelmann. 1895) (statistics for 1891 and 1893), See G. CHIO·
VENDA, Lo stato attuale del processo civile in Italia e il progetto Orlando di riforme
processuali, in I SAGGI DI DIRITIO PROCESSUALE CIVILE 395, 405 (Roma: Faro italiano.
1930); A. WACH, Mitndlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit, in VoRTRAGE iiBER DIE RE!CHS·
CrvILPROCESSORDNUNG 45 (Bonn: Marcus. 2d ed. 1896). Vollkommer gives the following
information about the judicial statistics for the years 1888-1889: 56% of all contentious
civil cases before the Landgerichte were terminated in less than six months, while
16% took more than one year (48% and 20% respectively for proceedings before the
Oberlandesgerichte, i.e., the courts of appeal). Vollkommer, supra note 18, at 124.
47. Detailed statistical tables based on information from the statistisches Bundesamt
in Wiesbaden and the Ministry of Justice in Bonn can be found in M. CAPP.ELLETI'I,
supra note 4, at 61-63.
Note, however, that if one considers only contentious proceedings terminated with
a judgment, the percentage of cases decided in less than six months becomes about
60% for both the Amtsgerichte and the Landgerichte. Moreover, if one considers only
the ordinary contentious proceedings terminated with a judgment in the Landgerichte,
thus excluding all special proceedings such as those involving matrimonial and
legitimacy matters, the statistics for 1968 indicate that the percentage of cases lasting
less than six months ranged from a minimum of 31.8% in Baden-Wiirttemberg to a
maximum of 48.4% in the Land Bremen, while the percentage of cases lasting more
than one year ranged from a minimum of 21.1 % in West Berlin to a maximum of
33.1% in Baden-Wiirttemberg. See the statistics published in Anlage zur Stellungnahme

des ZPO- und GVG-Ausschusses des DAV zum Regierungsentwurf der Beschleunigungsnovelle. Ziihlkartenstatistik 1968, in 20 ANWALTSBLA'IT 161, 162 (1970).
48. See, e.g., J. BAUMANN &: G. FEZER, BESCHLEUNIGUNG DES ZIVILPROZESSES (Tiibingen:
Mohr. 1970); F. BAUR, WEGE zu EINER KONZENTRATION DER MUNDLICHEN VERHANDLUNG
IM PRoZESS (Berlin: de Gruyter. 1966); Henke, ]udicia perpetua oder: Warum Prozesse
so Zange dauern ••• , 83 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR ZIVILPR.OZESS 125 (1970); Schubert, Das Streben
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plain. First, there still exists in Germany a remnant of that undue
"glorification" of appellate courts and proceedings, which, as we
have seen, was a typical feature of jus commune times. Thus, appeal
to the courts of second instance still tends to involve a de novo examination of the case. As a consequence, appeals are quite frequent, 40 and the over-all duration of litigation is greatly increased.
In other countries, however, such as Austria, where the ideals of
the reform movement admittedly have been implemented in a less
dogmatic, yet more consistent and realistic way, this defect has been
practically eliminated.rm
Second, compared to the results of the reform movement in other
countries, the German figures are still far from being fully satisfactory.111 The judicial statistics for Austria indicate that, in recent
years, the average duration of a civil case was only fifty to sixty days
in the Bezirksgerichte-which decide the bulk of civil litigationand about 145 days in the Gerichtshofe Erster lnstanz-the higher
courts of first instance.112 The statistics also indicate that only an
insignificant fraction of civil cases last longer than one year.113 It
should be noted that this fact is not simply the impressive but
inconclusive result of administering justice in a small, orderly
country. Soon after the Austrian Code of 1895 went into effect, when
nach Prozessbeschleunigung und Yerfahrensgliederung im Zivilprozessrecht des 19.
]ahrhunderts, 85 ZEITSCHRIFr DER SAVIGNY-SWiTUNG FilR R.ECHTSGESCHICHTE 127 (1968);
Vollkommer, supra note 18.
49. For comparative data, which indicate that appeals are strikingly more frequent
in Germany than in England, see F. A. MANN, DIE DEtrrSCHE JusrlZREFORM IM LICHT
ENGLISCHER ERFAHRUNG 5-6 (Karlsruhe: Milller. 1965). A strong trend toward limitation
of appeals in Germany is evident. See, e.g., F. BAUR, supra note 48, at 3, 23; BuNDESJUS!lZMINISTERIUM, BERICHT DER KOMMISSION ZUR VORBEREITUNG EINER REFORM DER
ZIVILGERICHTSBARKErr 117, 125-115 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundes-Verlag. 1961); Baur, supra
note 38, at 451-53; Zweigert, Zurn richterlichen Charisma in einer ethisierten Rechtsordnung, in FEsrGABE FUR CARLO SCHMID 299, 1107-08 (Tiibingen: Mohr. 1962).
50. On the principle of "limited appeal" (beschriinkte Berufung) adopted by the
Austrian Code see, e.g., G. PETSCHEK & F. STAGEL, DER OsrERREICHISCHE ZIVILPROZESS 364
(Wien: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitatsbuchhandlung. 1963).
51. This is attributed, in part, to the fact that in Germany the powers of the
judge to conduct and speed up the unfolding of the proceeding, modeled on the
Austrian Code but mostly discretionary, are not used in a sufficiently rigorous and
consistent way. See, e.g., F. BAUR, supra note 48, at 12-13; Baumgartel, Welche
Anregungen vermag das neue griechische Zivilprozessgesetzbuch fur die in Deutschland
geplante Prozessbeschleunigung zu geben1, 81 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ZIVILPROZESS 6, 9-10 (1968);
Vollkommer, supra note 18, at 121.
52. See Bajons, Buchbesprechung, 10 ZEITsCHRIFr FUR R.EcHTSVERGLEICHUNG 818, 820
(1969),
58. See STATIS!IK DER R.ECHTSPFLEGE FUR DAS JAHR 1968, at 20 (Wien: Csterreichisches
Statistisches Zentralamt. 1969), and for an analysis of these statistics M. CAPPELLETTI,
supra note 4, at 64 n.144. The statistics for 1969 do not show relevant changes. See
STATISTIK DER RECH'I'sPFLEGE FUR DAS JAHa 1969, at 20 (1970).
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Austria was a large empire with world-wide intellectual and political
ambitions, Franz Klein, the superb drafter of the Code, could proudly
affirm that the reform's goals were already achieved; proceedings had
become "simple, inexpensive, quick, and accessible to the poor." 5¼
Precise statistical data were given by him to prove this strong statement, showing the strikingly radical change ("die grosse Umwlilzung") in the duration of pre- and post-reform cases. 55
Finally, I want to mention briefly still another country that has
implemented the reform movement. In Sweden the official statistics
for 1967 indicate that the average duration of civil litigation is two
months from the date of filing to disposition of the case, with 33.5
per cent of all civil cases in courts of first instance terminated within
one month, 51.4 per cent within one to six months, and only 15.1
per cent lasting for more than six months. 5 6
Such data speak, I think, with a clearer voice than multi-volume
treatises. Although it is unquestionable that circumstances other than
the form of procedure may also produce delay-such as insufficient
staffing of the courts with judicial and clerical personnel, inadequate
court organization, and flaws in the substantive law-the recent
developments in Europe clearly demonstrate that the movement
toward "orality" has greatly helped to speed up the proceedings.
This conclusion seems to be confirmed by the fact that delay still
plagues civil proceedings in those other countries of Europe in which
the reform movement has not, or has only partially, been implemented. In Italy, in Spain, and to some extent even in France, the
unfolding of a civil case still resembles the efforts to start the broken
mechanism of a clock which "must be hit and shaken in order to be
put in motion even for a brief moment."57 Shaking and beating is
54. 1 F. KLEIN, REDEN, VORTRAGE, AUFSATZE, BRIEFE 87 (Wien: Manzsche Verlagsund Universitatsbuchhandlung. 1927).
55. Id. at 88. More data can be found in F. KLEIN, VoRLESuNGEN UBER DIE PRAXIS
DES CIVILPROCE'SSES 7-9 (Wien: Manz. 1900); F. KLEIN &: F. ENGEL, supra note 36, at 33038; Leonhard, Zur Geschichte der osterreichischen ]ustizreform vom ]ahre 1898, in
F.ESl'SCHRIFT ZUR FiiNFZIGJAHRFEIER DER OSTERREICHISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 1898-1948,
at 125, 152-54 (Wien: Manz. 1948). For instance, in 1898 there was a dramatic increase
in the percentage of cases showing a duration of less than six months from the time
of filing in the court of first instance to their termination in the court of second
instance. Such a percentage sprang from 1.9% in prereform cases to 48.2% in one
district, from 3,4% to 68.7% in another, and from 7.3% to 70% in still another.
1 F. KLEIN, supra note 54, at 88. Further data would not add anything to this over-all
picture.
56. Professor P.O. Ekelof of Uppsala kindly furnished me with the information in
the text.
57. This image is taken from the incisive description of prereform civil procedure
by a prominent Austrian legal scholar, A. MENGER, DAS BiiRGERLICHE RECHT UND DIE
BESITZLOSEN VOLKSKLASSEN, ch. I § 11 (Tubingen: Laup. 1908).
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done by party writings, and party writings in tum are prepared by
counsel, who do not necessarily suffer from court delay; there is
virtually no hearing in which the adjudicating court, not a mere
judge-commissioner, meets with the parties and the witnesses; the
decision is based on paper, not direct observation, and paper, of
course, may be gathered piecemeal; and finally, the previously noted
"glorification" of appeals still prevails.
Thus we have an average duration of eighteen and twenty-eight
months respectively for an ordinary proceeding of first instance in
Italy, before the lower and the higher courts of first instance; 58 one
of ten months in the Tribunaux de grande instance in France; 59 and
one of eight months in the ]uzgados de primera instancia in Spain. 60
Many Latin American countries do not count duration by days or
months, but by years; 61 no wonder, since their procedure resembles
jus commune procedure even more closely than does that of Italy or
Spain. 62
58. Detailed statistical data can be found in M. CAPPELLETII, supra note 4, at 65-66;
M. CAPPELLETII, J. MERRYMAN&: J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 125-26 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1967).
59. Civil procedure in the lower courts of first instance (Tribunaux d'instance) is
notably different from that in the higher courts (Tribunaux de grande instance). Only
in the lower courts is procedure primarily oral. See Lobin, Procedure t!crite et procedure
orate, in trUDES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAIN 161, 163, 166 (Paris: Les Editions de l'Epargne,
1970). Significantly, the average duration of civil proceedings of first instance changes
dramatically from the lower courts (seventy-three days in 1966) to the higher courts
(304 days in the same year). See ANNUAIRE STATJSTIQUE DE LA FRANCE 1968, at 129 (Paris:
Institut National de la Statistique et des l\:tudes Economiques. 1969). See also P. HERZOG,
supra note 21, at 139.
In France, repeated attempts have been made to enlarge the judges' power to
control and speed up litig:ition, particularly in 1935, 1958, 1965, and 1967. See, e.g.,
J. VINCENT, PRtcIS DE PROCEDURE CIVILE 440-46, 472 (Paris: Dalloz. 14th ed. 1969).
60. See ESTADfsnCAS JUDICIALES DE EsPANA. ANo 1966, at 123 (Madrid: Instituto
Nacional de Estadfstica. 1967). It should be noted that, particularly in the cases of
Spain and France, the official statistics used for our calculations seem less complete than
would be desirable. Private information suggests a greater delay in Spain than that
indicated by these statistics. In fact, the excessive duration of ordinary civil proceedings in Spain is generally recognized. See, e.g., I L. PRIETo-CASTRo FERRANDIZ, DERECHO
PRoCESAL CIVIL 358 (Madrid: Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado. 1964). The same
author secs this defect as a consequence of the written character of ordinary proceedings, which are still closely tied to the principles of jus commune procedure. Id, at
354-60.
All of the figures concerning the average duration of litigation given in this
Pl+ P2
Article were derived from the formula used by statisticians, i.e. - - - = d.
I+C
Pl represents the number of proceedings pending at the beginning of the year, P2 the
number of proceedings pending at the end of the year, I the number of proceedings
initiated during the year, and C the number of cases concluded during the year; d gives
the average duration in years and fractions of years.
61, See M. CAPPELLETII, supra note 4, at 66 n.150 (based on Latin American reports
not yet published).
62, Id. at 22 n.39.
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This, then, is a summary account of the development of civil
procedure in continental Europe in the recent past-apart from that
great schism of Eastern Europe which we will discuss· later.

IV.

CURRENT PROBLEMS AND TRENDS-CONSTITUTIONAL,

INTERNATIONAL, AND SOCIAL

Naturally, the "orality" movement, with all its derivative ideas,
is still very much alive as a basis for criticism and reform proposals
in countries, such as Spain63 or Italy,64 where too many remnants of
the old procedure prevail. In those countries, immediacy and concentration, efficiency and rapidity are still the problems.
In addition, however, a number of unprecedented problems have
lately emerged throughout the Continent-at least the Western part
of the Continent-that are typical reflections of a new reality and a
new society. I will briefly examine only three of them: the "constitutional" problem; the "community" and "international" problem;
and the "social" problem.
First, let us examine the constitutional problem. Emerging from
a disastrous war and an oppressive experience of political organization and ideological credo, several European nations, including Germany, Italy, and Austria, have turned to constitutional guarantees
as an anchor against similar storms. 65 As a first step, they have
adopted "rigid" constitutions-an innovation for Italy,66 although
not for Germany and Austria-and they have granted constitutional
status to some ideals of judicial administration such as judicial independence, the right to an impartial judge whose jurisdiction is
predetermined by law, the right to counsel, and the right to be
heard. 67 As a second step, they have instituted special constitutional
courts 68-an innovation for Italy and in effect also for Ger63. See, e.g., I L. PRIETo-CASTRo FERRANDIZ, supra note 60, at 355; de Miguel, Los
sistemas sabre la forma de la actividad procesal, REVISTA DE Esrun10s PROCESAW, No.
5, Sept. 1970 (at 1-11 of the reprint).
64. See, e.g., M. CAPPELLETI'l, supra note 9, vols. I and 2.
65. See Cole, Three Constitutional Courts: A Comparison, 53 AM. PoL. Ser. REV.
963; 965, 967, 983 (1959); Friedrich, The Political Theory of the New Democratic Constitutions, 12 REv. OF POLITIC:S 215, 217-18 (1950).
66. The Statuto Albertina of 1848, completely superseded only by the "rigid" Constitution of 1948, was an example of a nonrigid constitution. It could be changed by
ordinary legislation without the necessity of any special amendment procedure.
67. Italian Constitution in force since 1948, arts. 24, 25, 101, 102, 104, 107, 108;
German Constitution (Bonner Grundgesetz) in force since 1949, arts. 20, 92, 97, 101,
103; Austrian Constitution of 1920 (amended in 1929 and re-enacted in 1945), arts. 88,
87, 88, 90, 94 (not including provisions on right to counsel and right to be heard;
however, the provisions of art. 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights have
been constitutionalized in Austria. See notes 89, 90 infra and accompanying text).
68. See M. CAPPELLETI'I, JUDICIAL REVmw IN THE CoNTEMPORARY WORLD (Indianap-
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many, 60 though not for Austria70-entrusting them with the specific
task of controlling the observance and implementation of the constitution by governmental organs, especially the legislature. To be sure,
the American precedent of judicial review has played an influential
role in this development. France, of course, has not followed the
lead; 71 yet, it is noteworthy that the Conseil Constitutionnel of the
1958 French Constitution, although its role is to safeguard the
supremacy of the executive rather than to protect individual rights,
is less remote from a real constitutional court than was its unsuccessful predecessor under the 1946 Constitution, the Comite Constitutionnel.12 On the other hand, other countries have followed the
olis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1971); Geck, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative Survey of
Present Institutions and Practices, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 250 (1966).
69. Although there were some precedents for the present Bundesverfassungsgericht
in Germany, most notably the Staatsgerichtshof under the Weimar Republic, none of
them had a general power to review the constitutionality of legislation. See, e.g., H.
SPANNER, DIE RICHTERLICHE PRiiFUNG VON GESETZEN UND VERORDNUNGEN 6 (Wien: Springer.
1951); Friesenhahn, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and,
in MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VoLKERRECHT,
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 89, 92-99 (H. Mosler ed. Koln-Berlin:
Heymanns. 1962).
70. The Austrian Constitution of 1920 had already established a special constitutional court called Verfassungsgerichtshof. Arts. 89, 137-48.
71. The reasons-historical, ideological, and practical-for France's constant refusal
to introduce judicial review of legislation are analyzed in M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note
68, at ch. 2, § 4. See G. BORDEAU, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLmQUES
104-06 {Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 14th ed. 1969).
72. See, e.g., BuRDEAU, supra note 71, at 109-13; Eisenmann 8:: Hamon, La juridiction
Constitutionnelle en Droit Franrais, in MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT, supra note 69, at 231, 237,
242-43, 255-57; Waline, The Constitutional Coundl of the French Republic, 12 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 483, 484-85, 488, 492-93 (1963). In the restrictive application given so far
to articles 61 and 62 of the 1958 Constitution, the Conseil Constitutionnel's principal
function has only been to guarantee that the legislature will not interfere with the
large sphere of new "legislative power" of the executive. One of the central provisions
of the Constitution, article 34, lists the areas that are reserved to the legislature; civil
procedure, for example, is not included. Matters other than those listed in article 34
belong to the "regulatory power" of the executive (article 37), and the Conseil Constitutionnel will bar the promulgation of enactments of the legislature that trespass on
this territory.
The Conseil d'Etat has proved to be much more important for the protection of
civil liberties. Since the nineteenth century its principal role has been to protect the
rights of individuals from invasions by the public administration. In performing this
function, the Conseil d'Etat has creatively molded a body of "general principles" as
criteria binding on the public administration. Many of them have been derived from
the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and the Preamble to the Constitution, and
are considered to have constitutional force. See, e.g., B. JEANNEAU, LES PRINCIPES
GENERAUX DU DROIT DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE {Paris: Sirey. 1954); Syndicat
G~eral des Ingenieurs-Conseils, Conseil d'Etat, Decision of June 26, 1959, DALLoz,
JURISPRUDENCE 541 (1959). This development has become particularly important since
1958 when the executive's domain was dramatically increased. The Conseil d'Etat has
courageously affirmed the extension of its judicial review to the "regulatory power"
of the executive, thus becoming the most important organ of control of the constitutionality of state action in France. See, e.g., F. BATAILLER, LE CONSEIL D'ETAT JUGE
CONSTITUTIONNEL 196-219 (Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias. 1966).
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constitutional trend, including Turkey,73 and since 1963 even Yugoslavia.74
The new trend, no doubt, encompasses much more than civil procedure. Constitutional guarantees, as envisaged by the Italian, the
German, or the Austrian constitutions, govern not only civil, but to
an even greater degree, criminal proceedings. Yet, perhaps unexpectedly, the impact has been great even in the field of civil litigation. In
the last few years, from one or another of the European constitutional
courts we have learned, for instance, that it is a violation of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to have an independent and statutorily predetermined judge when civil jurisdiction is entrusted to a
court whose members are at the same time functionaries of the active
administration.75 We have also learned that the plaintiff's constitu73. Turkish Constitution of 1961, arts. 145-52. See, e.g., Bekir Balta, Die Verfassungs•
gerichtsbarkeit in der Turkei, in MAx-PLANCK-INsTITUT, supra note 69, at 550-67.
74. Yugoslavian Constitution of 1963, arts. 241-51. See, e.g., W. GELLHORN, OMBUDS·
MEN AND OTHERS 273-78 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1966); Djordjevic, Les
Cours constitutionnelles en Yougoslavie, 14 (No. 4) LE NOUVEAU DROIT YoucoSLAVE 9
(1963).

On the spread of judicial review to other countries see M. CAPPELLE1TI, supra note
68, at ch. 3, § 2.
75. German Constitutional Court, Decision of November 17, 1959, No. 15, 10
ENTSCHEIDUNCEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNCSGERICHTS 200. As a result of this very important
decision, more than 1,400 small courts (Friedensgerichte) were abolished in the Land

Baden-Wiirttemberg. One of the principal reasons for the decision was the fact that the
local mayors acted as judges in these courts. A second judgment has clarified and
somewhat attenuated the prior decision, due more to a recognition of a deeply rooted,
centuries-old tradition of the Land Baden-Wiirttemberg than to any weakening of the
constitutional principle of strict separation of powers. Decision of May 9, 1962, No. 11,
14 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNCSCERICHTS 56, 75-76.
The principle stated in the text undoubtedly holds true for Italy, whether the courts
involved are civil, criminal, or administrative. See, e.g., Italian Constitutional Court,
Decision of June 3, 1966, No. 55, 11 GIURJSPRUDENZA COSTlTUZIONALE 879 (1966) (unconstitutionality of the Prefectural Councils because the members of these courts were at
the same time members of the public administration; these courts had adjudicatory
powers concerning the financial liability of local government employees); Decision of
March 22, 1967, No. 30, 90 FoRo ITALIANO I, 681 (1967) (unconstitutionality, for the
same reasons, of the judicial functions of the Giunte Provinciali Amministrative which
heard claims against local administrative entities); Decision of Dec. 22, 1962, No. 108,
115 G1URJSPRUDENZA ITALIANA I:I, 305 (1963) (unconstitutionality of the special agricultural divisions of the ordinary civil courts of general jurisdiction; the majority of the
judges were lay "experts" who lacked full independence since they were, in effect, chosen
by their professional associations which could also require their substitution at any
time). For a statement of an even stronger doctrine, see Italian Constitutional Court,
Decision of Dec. 22, 1961, No. 70, 6 GIURJSPRUDENZA COSTlTUZIONALE 1282 (1961). In this
case, the Court declared a statute unconstitutional because in certain lease litigations it
bound the ordinary civil courts to a technical determination of facts by an administra•
tive body. The statute left to the judge review of violations of law, contradictions, and
patent errors of opinion in the administrative determination, and entitled the judge to
request clarification or to order an entirely new determination, but only by the same
administrative body. However, in the words of the Constitutional Court, "the challenged
provisions take away from the judge the power to freely evaluate the principal issue
of the controversy; in this way, the decision of the case is in substance taken from the
ordinary judge and placed in the hands of an administrative organ." Id. at 1289.

April 1971]

Civil Procedure in Europe

863

tional "right of action" is violated by requiring him, at the discretion
of the judge, to post a security bond as a prerequisite to the commencement or prosecution of an action. 76 We have learned that even
in civil cases a right to counsel and a system of legal aid may be
necessary elements of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair
hearing, 77 and that even in civil cases unconstitutionally obtained
evidence may be excluded.78 Inadequate notice, as well as unreasonable limitations of the parties' right to present or to refute evidence,
have also been held to constitute violations of constitutional guar76. See Italian Constitutional Court, Decision of Nov. 29, 1960, No. 67, 5 G1tJRIS·
PRUDENZA cosnroZIONALE 1195 (1960) (the Court found that the prerequisite could have
the effect of denying access to court, i.e., right of action, to those who, although not
eligible for legal aid, had insufficient means to post the bond).
In Germany, the Bundesuerfassungsgericht considered a similar issue. Decision of
Jan. 12, 1960, No. 22, 10 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 264. The
Court held the challenged statute constitutional, but stated that, if through these
provisions "recourse to the courts is made unreasonably exacting or difficult," it would
be no longer consistent with the Constitution. Id. at 268.
77. See German Constitutional Court, Decision of June 18, 1957, No. 6, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 53 (denial of legal aid in a proceeding
concerning the legitimacy of a child found to violate the right to be heard guaranteed
by art. 103 of the Constitution; the fact that in such proceedings the judge has extensive powers of initiative does not make a request for legal aid capricious). See Italian
Constitution, art. 24, para. 2 (right to counsel) and para. 3 (legal aid: "Poor persons
must, by appropriate institutions, be assured the means to plead and to defend themselves before any judicial body'?•
An analogous doctrine has been affirmed under the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See European Commission
of Human Rights, Application No. 2804/66 (Struppat v. The Federal Republic of
Germany), July 16, 1968, 27 CoLI.ECTION OF DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 61. Note that some of the member states attribute to the Convention
constitutional or even supraconstitutional force. See note 89 infra.
78. In Germany, the Supreme Federal Court for civil and criminal matters (Bundesgerichtshof) has excluded, both in civil and criminal cases, the use of evidence obtained
in violation of the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. Moreover, this doctrine
has been affirmed iuespective of whether the evidence was obtained privately or by
public officials. See Bundesgerichtshof, Civil Division, Decision of May 20, 1958, 11
NEUE JURISTISCHE WoCHENSCHRIFT 1344 (1958) (secret tape recording by a private person
of a conversation excluded in a civil case); Bundesgerichtshof, Criminal Division,
Decision of Feb. 21, 1964, 17 NEUE JURISI'ISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1139 (1964) (use of
private diaries by the public prosecutor without the consent of their author excluded
in a criminal case, whether they came into the possession of the prosecutor through a
state or a private act).
In Italy, the Constitutional Court has recently affirmed that judges cannot base their
decisions on "evidence forbidden by law." Although occasioned by a criininal case, the
statement is formulated as a general principle of law, applicable in any proceeding.
Constitutional Court, Decision of Dec. 2, 1970, No. 175, 95 FoRo ITALIANO I, 2985
(1970).
See also European Commission of Human Rights, Application No. 2645/65 (Scheichelbauer v. Austria), Oct. 3, 1969, 30 COLI.ECTION OF DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COM•
MISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (admission by an Austrian court of illegally obtained
evidence found possibly to violate the "right to a fair hearing" guaranteed by art. 6,
para. 1, of the Convention; although stated in the context of a criminal case, the
language used by the Commission seems of general applicability since art. 6, para. I
applies equally to civil cases).
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antees. 79 More generally, civil as well as criminal courts have been
constitutionally required not to base their decisions on facts, evidence, or procedural acts on which the parties have had no adequate
opportunity to be heard.80
The analogies to, and divergencies from, developments in
American constitutional jurisprudence are readily apparent. On the
one hand, the European courts have been in the process of articulating minimum standards of due process similar, in part, to those developed by the United States Supreme Court. On the other hand, it
seems important to observe that, particularly in the field of civil litigation, the constitutional decisions in Europe in some respects have
gone even farther than those in the United States.81 For instance, the
79. "Notice is a necessary instrument of a fair bearing." Italian Constitutional
Court, Decision of June 6, 1965, No. 57, 10 GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 717, 723
(1965). Although this decision was occasioned by a criminal case, the language used by
the Court is clearly general, and applies to any type of judicial proceeding. For Germany
see, e.g., Constitutional Court, Decision of Feb. 1, 1967, No. 17, 21 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BuNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 132 (failure to notify the father about a legitimacy pro•
ceeding held to violate his right to be heard).
On the parties' right to present or refute evidence see Italian Constitutional Court,
Decision of Dec. 22, 1961, No. 70, 6 GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 1282 (1961). This
decision, discussed in note 75 supra, was also based on the consideration that the
binding fact determination by the administrative body deprived the parties of their
constitutional right to present and to refute evidence. Also see Italian Constitutional
Court, Decision of June 3, 1966, No. 53, 11 GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 858 (1966).
In this case, a statute giving the state railroad discretionary power to withhold from
the court, whether civil or criminal, factual findings of investigations made after rail•
road accidents was held to violate the parties' right to be heard. "In fact, if the right
of the parties to present to the judge favorable facts is denied or limited, if the right
to exhibit evidence concerning those facts is denied or limited, it is then the judicial
protection itself which is denied or limited." Id. at 870. For Germany, see Constitu•
tional Court, Decision of Jan. 15, 1969, No. 14, 25 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFAS•
sUNGSGERICHTS 137 (total judicial disregard of a party's motion to introduce testimonial
evidence in a case for recovery of a broker's commission violates his right to be heard).
At the European Convention level, see European Commission of Human Rights,
Application No. 852/60 (X v. The Federal Republic of Germany), Sept. 19, 1961, in
1961 YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 346, 354 (" ••• in
certain types of cases or in certain circumstances, the refusal by a court to allow the
witness or witnesses called by the plaintiff to testify, could involve a violation of art. 6,
para. I, which recognizes the right of everyone to a fair hearing by an impartial
tribunal that will determine his civil rights and obligations.') (dictum).
80. See, e.g., German Constitutional Court, Decision of July 24, 1963, No. 5, 17
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 86 (failure to give the party an opportunity to contest expert testimony held to violate his right to be heard). "We have
consistently affirmed that art. 103, para. 1, of the Constitution does not allow a judicial
decision to be based on facts or evidence on which the parties have not had an
opportunity to be heard." Id. at 95. For Italy see Constitutional Court, Decision of
Dec. 22, 1961, No. 70, 6 G!URISPRUDENZA COSTITUZ!ONALE 1282 (1961).
81. Consider, for instance, that in the United States the right to appointed counsel
and legal aid is not yet regarded as a constitutional requirement in civil cases and the
same is true for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. However, there has been
some discernible movement toward extending these constitutional requirements to
civil litigation. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM, L.
R.Ev. 1322 (1966) (arguing that the right of an indigent civil litigant to appointed coun•
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European developments would very probably make it impossible, at
least in some continental nations, to employ methods such as those
suggested by authoritative sources in this country to reduce the backlog of the courts "by blocking off some of the roads to the courthouse, "82-particularly by excluding small claims and traffic injury
cases from the courts. 83 In the European view, these methods would
violate the constitutional "right of action,"-the right of everyone
to have all of his substantive rights and legitimate interests protected
by "predetermined," "impartial," "judicial" bodies, that is, the
courts.84 Hence, if it is true that the excessive judicial load can be
sel is constitutionally required by both the equal protection and due process clauses);
Note, The lndigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967); State v.
Union Asphalt &: Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 406-10 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (illegally
seized evidence excluded in antitrust suit for civil damages); Carlisle v. State ex rel.
Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 S.2d 596 (1964) (illegally obtained evidence excluded in
civil action for abatement of gambling): Carson v. State ex rel. Price, 221 Ga. 299, 303,
144 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1965) (gambling abatement; "That this mandate [of exclusion] was
not for criminal cases only is clear from the Mapp decision and from the more recent
pronouncement in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan .•..") Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93
N.W.2d 281 (1958) (results of blood test taken while defendant was unconscious excluded
in a civil case involving two private parties on the basis of state constitutional provision
similar to fourth amendment): Dixson v. New York, 54 Misc. 2d 100, 281 N.Y.S.2d 912
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (evidence illegally obtained by state officials excluded in civil litigation);
Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (1966) (exclusion of evidence in
divorce proceedings).
The United States Supreme Court has, itself, only gone so far as to exclude illegally
obtained evidence in what may be termed "quasi-criminal" proceedings. See One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (forfeiture proceeding). However,
some strong dissenting opinions have suggested that several members of the Court are
not happy with the distinction between civil and criminal cases in the application of
the fourth amendment. See, particularly, the dissents of Justices Douglas (joined by
Justice Black) and Brennan (joined by Justices Black and Douglas and Chief Justice
Warren) in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 248 (1960) and Justice Douglas
(joined by Justices Black and Brennan) in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374-76 (1959).
The language expressing this view is especially strong: "The Court now casts a shadow
over that guarantee as respects searches and seizures in civil cases. Any such conclusion
would require considerable editing and revision of the Fourth Amendment•••• The
protection of the Fourth Amendment has heretofore been thought to protect privacy
when civil litigation, as well as criminal prosecutions was in the offing..•.The Court
misreads history when it relates the Fourth Amendment primarily to searches for
evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions." Frank was effectively overruled in
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The Court condemned warrantless
searches by health officials as violative of the fourth amendment, thus making it appear
likely that the exclusionary rule will be applied to such administrative searches in the
future.
82. Rosenberg, Frank Talk on Improving the Administration of Justice, 47 TEXAS
L. R.Ev. 1029, 1034 (1969).
83. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 1034-35; Wright, Procedural Reform: Its
Limitations and Its Future, l GEORGIA L. REV. 563, 568-69 (1967).
Of course, changes in the substantive law and insurance plans that would make
recourse to court less necessary and frequent would be unaffected by the developments
mentioned in the text.
84. See Italian Constitution, arts. 24, para. I ("Everyone has a right of access to the
courts for the protection of his rights and legitimate interests") and 25, para. 1 (:'No
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reduced only by transferring a portion of it to nonjudicial agencies
or by dividing it among a larger number of judges, the current
European solution would bluntly reject the first alternative, no
matter how many hundreds or thousands of new judges would have
to be provided. 85
one shall be denied the right to have his case decided by his natural, statutorily predetermined judge"). In addition, art. II3 specifically extends the individual's right to
have judicial protection to cases involving administrative action. All these provisions
of the Constitution have been liberally applied by the Constitutional Court in a number
of decisions which have declared several statutes unconstitutional because they limited
or denied this "right of action." See, e.g., L. CoMOGUO, LA GARANZIA COSTITUZIONALE
DELL'AZIONE ED IL PROCESSO CMLE (Padova: Cedam. 1969). One momentous case was
Constitutional Court, Decision of March 31, 1961, No. 21, 6 GIURJSPRUDENZA cosrITUZIONALE 138 (1961). In that case the Court struck down a traditional institution of tax
law, the "solve et repete," which obliged the taxpayer to pay the amount assessed by the
taxing agencies before being allowed to challenge the assessment in court.
As for Germany, there is no explicit general provision in the Constitution concerning
a "right of action", but art. 19, para. 4 guarantees recourse to the courts for all violations of individual rights and legitimate interests through any activity of public
authorities. On the broad interpretation of art. 19, para. 4, given by both the German
courts and the legal scholars, see, e.g., H. PETERS, GESCHICHTUCHE ENTWICKLUNG UND
GRUNDFRAGEN DER VERFASSUNG 277-78 (Berlin: Springer. 1969). Moreover, a general "right
of action" in civil and criminal matters is considered to be a consequence of the
provisions of arts. 20 para. 2, 92, 97, 101 para. 1, and 103 para. I, of the Constitution.
See, e.g., A. BAUMBACH, w. LAUTERBACH 8: J. ALBERS, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 1821 (Miinchen: Beck. 30th ed. 1970) ("In view of Art. 92 of the Constitution it is no longer
permissible to transfer civil matters from the courts to administrative organs'): R.
ZOLLER, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 1047 (Miinchen: Stutz. 10th ed. 1968) (with reference to
court decisions); Fechner, Kostenrisiko und Rechtswegsperre-Steht der Rechtsweg
ofjen?, 1969 JURISTENZEITUNG 349; German Constitutional Court, Decision of June 6,
1967, No. 6, 22 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 49, 77-81. This does
not mean that it would be unconstitutional to precondition recourse to the court on a
prior administrative proceeding, provided that such recourse includes a full re-examination, both of fact and law. See, e.g., German Constitutional Court, Decision of Nov. 10,
1964, No. 27, 18 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 203, 212 ("The right of
access to court guaranteed by Art. 19, para. 4, of the Constitution, must provide for a
complete re-examination by a court of the challenged action of the public authority,
with respect both to fact and law'); Decision of Feb. 5, 1963, No. 24, 15 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICH'J'S 275, 282; A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH 8: J • .ALnERS,
supra, at 1821; R. ZOLLER, supra, at 1047.
The reader should be made aware of the forceful historical background of such a
jealous concern in the Italian and German Constitutions for safeguarding access to the
courts. Under the fascist dictatorships, it was not unusual to exempt administrative
action from judicial review and thereby arbitrarily to deprive individuals of their rights
through the denial of a judicial remedy. A poignant example can be found in the field
of the infamous racial legislation; judicial review was abolished for governmental
action against the Jews. See 2 P. CALAMANDREI, !STITUZIONI DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE
78-79 (Padova: Cedam. 1943) republished in 4 P. CALAMANDREI, OPERE GIURIDJCHE 310-11
(M. Cappelletti ed. Napoli: Morano. 1970). For analogous developments in NaziGermany see, e.g., E. KERN, supra note 18, at 151, 199, 202; Fechner, supra at 349.
Even in France, in the absence of a similar historical background, the Conseil d'Etat
has established that judicial review of administrative action involving exces de pouvoir
is a general principle of constitutional force. See Ministre de !'Agriculture v. Dame
Lamotte, Conseil d'Etat, Decision of Feb. 17, 1950, in M. LONG, P. WEIL 8: G. BRAIBANT,
LEs GRANDS ARRtrs DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINisrRATJVE 325 (Paris: Sirey. 4th ed. 1965);
Falco 8: Vidaillac, Conseil d'Etat, Decision of April 17, 1953, in id. at 388.
85. Indeed, there were 8,935 professional judges active in the ordinary courts in
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Even more important, perhaps, is the impact of these new constitutional developments on the psychology of the continental judge
and of European society _at large. Although German and Italian
judges are not entitled to set aside unconstitutional statutes---the
power to annul such statutes being reserved to the respective constitutional courts---they do have the power and the duty to suspend a
civil or criminal case and to submit the decision on the constitutional
issue to the constitutional court.86 Thus, a new "constitutional
conscience" is growing among a rather bureaucratic "career judiciary" which for centuries has been only too subservient, if not always
to the executive, certainly to codes and other written legislation. This
is a radical and, on the whole, quite welcome change, the far-reaching
consequences of which I leave to your consideration.
Second, let us consider the "community" and, more generally,
the "international" problem. A large part of Europe is slowly moving
Germany on January 1, 1961, whereas there were 10,299 on January 1, 1969; they
comprise about 80% of the whole professional judiciary (a total of 12,798 on January 1,
1969, see STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 1969, at 100
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 1969)). In Italy, there were 5,271 professional judges on
February 15, 1964, and 6,403 on January 29, 1970. In Austria, there were 1,308 in 1962
and 1,537 in 1968. See Baur, supra note 38, at 449 and n.21 (Germany and Austria);
CONSIGLIO SUPER!ORE DELLA. MAGISTR.ATURA, RE.Al.TA SOCI.ALE E AMMINISTR.AZIONE DELLA
GIUSTIZIA-R.Er.Az!ONE ANNUALE SULLO STATO DELLA GIUSTIZIA 105-07 (Roma. 1970) (Italy). See
also Dinslage, Das Richteramt in der Krise, in DIE UNABHANGIGKEIT DES RICHTERS 27-28
(Koln: Grote. 1969). It may be interesting to consider that in New York City, which has
a population of about eight million, slightly above that of Austria, there are only 367
professional judges, and that increases such as those of sixty-three new federal judgeships in 1961, thirty-five in 1966, and sixteen in 1968, have been considered dramatic
and unprecedented in the United States. See D. K.ARu:N, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE
AMERICAN ExPERIENCE 32 (London: Butterworths. 1970); Fleming, Court Survival in the
Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE 109 (1970); Olney, An Analysis of Docket Con•

gestion in the United States District Courts in the Light of the Enactment of the
Omnibus Judgeship Bill, 29 F.R.D. 217, 218 (1961).
Other devices that have been used here and there in the United States in order to
reduce delay would also be considered unconstitutional if employed in Europe. For
example, certain "deflecting" or "channeling" procedures designed to divert cases from
busier courts to less congested ones, usually of lower jurisdictional limits, would violate
the constitutional guarantee of a legally predetermined judge ("lawful" or "natural"
judge: German Constitution, art. 101, para. l; Italian Constitution, art. 25, para. l;
Austrian Constitution, art. 83, para. 2). One extreme version of this device is the New
York "never-never" calendar where cases are placed on a low priority list and are never
heard until the attorneys agree to litigate in a court of lower jurisdiction. See, e.g., H.
ZEISEL, H. K.ALVEN, &: B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 209-11 (Boston: Little, Brown.
1959); Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29, 42-43 (H. Jones ed. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1965). Also, the Pennsylvania system of compulsory arbitration of
small claims with review in the courts being preconditioned on the payment of a fee
which is nonrefundable even if the appellant is victorious in court would certainly
violate the constitutional right of action as conceived in Europe. For a description of
this Pennsylvania institution see H. ZEisEL, H. K.ALVEN &: B. BUCHHOLZ, supra, at 214-15;
Rosenberg, supra, at 51-53.
·
86. See M. CA!'PELLETTI, supra note 68, at ch. 4.
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from a conception of absolute state sovereignties to a new dimension
that is more community and internationally oriented. As in the
constitutional field, so in this field the "American challenge" is
strongly at work. Indeed, the "Europe of the nations," divided and
disorganized both economically and politically, increasingly feels the
challenge represented by modern federalism as exemplified by the
United States and, for that matter, by the Soviet Union. These are
mass psychological feelings, the future impact of which can hardly
be foreseen. We are still quite far, of course, from some kind of
European federation; yet the elements of a more integrated Europe
are growing, even in the field of civil procedure. Evidence of such
integration can be found in the recent convention for the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,
concluded under the auspices of the European Economic Community by the six member states in Brussels in 1968, as well as the
draft-convention governing bankruptcy, arrangements, and similar
proceedings.87 Even more important is the close relationship established between the national courts and the Court of Justice of the
European Communities. When faced with questions of interpretation or validity of Community Law, the national courts may, or if
they are courts of last resort must, refer the issue to the Community
Court for a binding decision.88 Also significant is article 6 of the
87. Americans have been critical of the E.E.C. Convention on recognition and
enforcement of judgments. See, e.g., Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in
Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 CoLUM. L. REv.
995 (1967); Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention and a Hague
Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1282 (1969); Hay,

The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments-Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation, 16 AM. J.
COMP. L. 149 (1968); Hamburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,
18 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 390-94 (1970). For a sound summary see R. SCHLESINGER, CoMPARATIVE LAW 294 (Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press. 3d ed. 1970). We are ready to
admit that the Convention is a rather parochial document insofar as nations other
than the six member states are concerned. However, there is no doubt that, within the
Community, the E.E.C. Convention represents an important step away from the "Europe
of the Nations," particularly insofar as it foregoes the future use of improper bases of
jurisdiction as against defendants domiciled within the Common Market area.
For the Draft Convention on bankruptcy see, e.g., Hirsch, Vers l'universalite de la
faillite au sein du Marche commun?, 6 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 50 (1970); Nadelmann,

L'avant-projet de convention du marche commun sur la faillite: les biens sitw!s a
l'etranger et les problemes qu'ils posent, 6 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZI0NALE PRIVATO E
PROCESSUALE 501 (1970); Noel & Lemontey, Aperfus sur le projet de convention euro•
peenne relative a la faillite, aux concordats et aux procedures analogues, 4 REVUE

TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 703 (1968).
88. Article 177 of the European Economic Community Treaty; art. 150 of the
Euratom Treaty; art. 41 of the European Coal and Steel Community. See, e.g., A. GREEN,
POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE 167-97 (Leyden: Sijthoff. 1969); P. HAY,
FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 120-51 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press. 1966); E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAw AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 180-99
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1967).
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European Convention of Human Rights-and here we already
move into the sphere of the Europe of the fifteen nations, not the
six.89 That article establishes minimum standards of due process for
domestic criminal and civil proceedings, including a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
court established by law.90 Admittedly, the Court at Strasbourg and
the other organs of the Convention have been showing to date more
restraint than boldness in the implementation of this and other
parts of the Convention.91 Yet, this initial restraint is probably understandable, particularly in view of the remarkable innovation
represented by the Convention which permits individuals to bring
actions before supranational organs against their own state.92 Moreover, the forced withdrawal of the Greece of the colonels from the
Council of Europe and the Convention suggests that the Convention already has something meaningful to require of its members
in the field of civil liberties.
Let me conclude on this point by saying that, parallel to a slowly
growing "constitutional conscience," there is also a "community,"
"European," and "international" conscience growing among the
judges and people on the old "Continent of the nations." There are
many signs of this development, even beyond bilateral or multi89. Apart from the international force, which of course is identical for all member
states, the force attributed to the Convention by each state within its domestic legal
order covers a broad spectrum. It ranges from states where the Convention is considered
superior to the Constitution itself (e.g., Netherlands), to those where it has constitutional
force (e.g., Austria), to those where it has the force of ordinary law (e.g., Germany,
Italy), and finally to those where it does not acquire the status of domestic law (e.g.,
United Kingdom). See, e.g., Bucrgenthal, The Domestic Status of the European Con•
vention on Human Rights: A Second Look, 7 JOURNAL OF THE INTERNAnONAL COM·
MISSION OF JURISTS 55 (1966).
90. For some cases of particular interest sec notes 77.79 supra. Also sec Buergcnthal,
Comparative Study of Certain Due Process Requirements of the European Human
Rights Convention, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 18 (1966); Grementieri, La convention euro•
pdenne des droits de l'homme et le proces civil, 5 REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROrr EURO•
PEEN 463 (1969); Rasenack, "Civil Rights and Obligations" or "Droits et Obligations de
Caractere Civil": Two Crucial Legal Determinations in Art. 6 (I) of the European Con•
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 3 HUMAN
RIGHTS J. 51 (1970),
91. A recent indictment was made by F. Newman, The Convention and Worldwide
Human Rights: Some Iconoclastic Inquiries, Communication to the !Id International
Colloquy About the European Convention on Human Rights, Oct. 3, 1970 (publication
pending).
A typical recent example is the "Delcourt" Case, Judgment of the European Court
of Human Rights, D 34.773, Jan. 17, 1970 (participation of public prosecutor in the
deliberation in chambers of the Belgian Court of Cassation without any opportunity
for the accused to be represented at this discussion held unanimously not to violate
art. 6 of the Convention).
92, It is unfortunate that Italy, as well as Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey, have not yet
accepted the clause of the Convention giving standing to individuals.
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lateral treaties and even in France, which still too often seems to feel
the attraction of an outmoded vision of national grandeur. Indeed,
it was in France, in 1964-when General de Gaulle was still at his
apex of power-that a spontaneous judicial development occurred in
the Munzer case in which the Gour de cassation practically wiped out
the traditional power of the French judges to review the merits of a
foreign judgment before giving it recognition. 93 My learned friend,
Kurt Nadelmann, greeted this decision with an article subtitled:
"One Down, and More To Go" 94-and there is more to go, of
course. Yet, even in this field, the trend is clear. Since it corresponds
to one of the deepest needs and intellectual attitudes of our timeinternational openness-I believe that this trend, too, once finally
unchained, will go very far indeed, possibly within a relatively short
time.
I turn now to the third and last of the newly emerged problems:
the "social" problem of equal access to justice. No social theory of
justice could prevail, of course, on the eve of the French and European Revolution, under the dominance of physiocratic theories
nurtured in the hothouse of Louis XV's Court. A first major step
was effected, as we saw,95 by the Revolutionary abolition of the
privileged jurisdictions and the proclamation of the idea of free
administration of justice. Thus, the Revolution eradicated a centuries old custom of having the judges paid by the parties; it did
not eliminate, however, all the other expenses of justice, such as
lawyers' fees and court costs.96 Once more, the bourgeois egalite
proved to be a very important, but only partial step. All citizens
93. Munzer v. Munzer-Jacoby, Cour de Cassation, 1st Civil Division, Jan. 7, 1964, in
1964 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE II 13590 (with comment by Ancel), 1964 (1st sem.) GAZETIE
DU PALAIS·JURISPRUDENCE 372, 1964 R.EvuE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 344
(with comment by Batiffol).
We should mention another important development which again evidences a growing respect for foreign legal values by the domestic courts of Europe. A line of deci•
sions of the Italian Court of Cassation, initiated in 1959, struck down the traditional
conception of foreign law as a mere fact, and affirmed the equal treatment in civil
proceedings of national law and of foreign law made applicable by conflict-of-law
rules. See Finaly v. Bonnin, Corte di Cassagione, 2d Civil Division, Judgment of Feb.
16, 1966, No. 486, in 118 GIURISPRUDENZA !TALIANA I:l, 1401 (1966) (with comment by
Cappelletti), 91 FoRo ITALIANO I, 1549 (1966). For an analysis of the policy implications of this development, which is one manifestation of a trend present in a growing
number of countries, see Cappelletti, Mandatory Ex-Officio Application of Foreign

Law: The Comparative Method as an Answer in Cases where the Foreign Law Cannot Be Ascertained, 3 COMPARATIVE AND INTL. L. J. OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 49 (1970);
note 158 infra.
94. Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments: One Down and
More to Go, 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 72 (1964).
95. See notes 22 &: 23 supra and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., P. CATALA &: F. TERRE, supra note 22, at 19.
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achieved formal equality before the law-yet it is clear today that to
treat the economically and socially disadvantaged on an equal footing is but another kind of injustice.97
Very concrete and precise data are available to define the extent
of this problem, as may be illustrated by an examination of the way
the laissez-faire century dealt with the problem of civil justice for
the poor. For example, the French, the Italian, and the German
solutions go back to the apogee period of laissez-faire: 1851,98
1865,99 and 1877100 respectively. They strongly resembled one another and, despite some improvement in Germany,101 they are, practically speaking, still the law. These solutions are essentially based
on the idea of the so-called "honorific duty" of the legal profession
to provide free legal aid to the indigent. Poor parties must, of
course, demonstrate poverty and good cause, but once they have
done so they are treated on an equal footing with the rich: free
counsel, free justice-justice for all.
Yet, it goes without saying that in a free market economy unpaid
services tend to be poor. Poor services for the poor! Indeed, it is
an accepted rule in France that the "honorific duty" only applies
to the stagiaires, the young and inexperienced lawyers; 102 the experienced lawyers generously renounce the honor-and prefer to be paid.
Also, in order to be able to demonstrate poverty and, above all, good
cause, the poor, the disabled, and the illiterate need legal advice and
97. See, e.g., P. CALAMANDREI, PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 89-104 (New York: N.Y.U.
Press 1956). As noted earlier, a first attempt to deal with the problem of effective
equality of the parties was made in the Austrian Code of 1895. See note 38 supra and
accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., P. CATALA &: F. TERRE, supra note 22, at 20-21; P. FROTIER DE LA
MESSELitJu:, L'ASSISTANCE JUDICIAIRE 41, 42 (Paris: Dalloz. 1941).
99. See, e.g., Cappelletti, Poverta e giustizia, 94 FoRo ITALIANO V, 42, 46 (1969).
100. ZMLPROZESSORDNUNG of 1877, §§ 114-27. See, e.g., A. BLOMEYER, ZMLPROZESSRECHT
740 (Berlin: Springer. 1963); R. SCHOTT, DAS ARMENRECHT DER DEUTSCHEN CIVIL•
PROZESSORDNUNG 43, 163-66 Gena: Fischer. 1900).
101. Although the German solution was originally based, like the French and the
Italian, on the idea of "honorific duty" (nobile officium) of the lawyers, changes have
been introduced starting as far back as 1919. As a result, German lawyers who handle
legal aid cases are compensated by a state fund. This compensation, however, is based
on a special fee schedule which, particularly in disputes involving larger amounts and
in matrimonial cases, pays much less than the usual fees. It can in no case exceed a
maximum of 216 DM (less than $60), and is limited to 75 DM {about $20) in matrimonial and some other status cases. See Bundesgebilhrenordnung fur Rechtsanwiilte
(BRAGebO) §123 (as amended on October 29, 1969); A. BLOMEYER, supra note 100, at
743; L. ROSENBERG &: K. SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 425 (Miinchen: Beck. 10th ed. 1969);
Heimerich, Das ilberlebte Armenrecht, 1960 DER BETRIEBs-BERATER 1071, 1072.
102. See J. ABEILLE, UNE CERTAINE REFORME 57-58 (Paris: Pichon &: Durand-Auzias.
1970); 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL Am AssOCIATION, DIRECTORY OF LEGAL Am AND
ADVICE FACILITIES AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, under France B 9 (London-New
York 1966); R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 87, at 103.
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help. Even today in Italy, an application for legal aid must be put in
writing on special stamped paper and submitted to the legal aid commission attached to the "competent" court; and a meritorious claim
or defense must be demonstrated by a "specific" and "clear" statement not only of the facts, but also of the means of proof available
and of the legal grounds for relief.103 Thus, in order to be able to ask
for free legal aid, one needs legal aid.
Once again, the dry statistical figures speak with a clear voice. In
1966, a typical year, 449,947 ordinary civil proceedings were initiated
in Italy in the courts of first instance, of which only 2,587 were legal
aid cases-about 0.57 per cent.104 What a happy country, where only
0.57 per cent of the people are poor! Everybody knows that, unfortunately, this is not the case. The naked truth is that the doors of the
courts of justice are closed and sealed to the poor.105
The deception, then, becomes clear. Justice is not equal for all.
This fact may be further evidenced by other data; such as those
demonstrating the ratio between the amount in litigation and the
amount of counsel fees and court costs falling upon the parties. In
1958, Kaplan, von Mehren, and Schaefer indicated that in Germany
the ratio ran from 4.1 per cent in larger cases, to fifty-four per cent in
smaller ones. 106 Recent research by a noted Spanish proceduralist
103. See M. CAPPELLETl'I, La giustizia dei poveri, in PROCESSO E IDEOLOGIE 547-56
(Bologna: II Mulino. 1969) (exploring the snares and delusions in the administration of
legal aid in Italy).
104. See ANNUARIO DI STATISTICHE GIUDIZIARIE 1966, at 19, 27 (Roma: Istituto Centrale
di Statistica. 1968). The latest issue of the ANNUARIO contains the data for 1967; the
proportion was 0.49%,
Note, however, that in this field the situation in Italy appears to be much worse
than that in Germany and France. In France in 1966, out of a total of 441,290 civil
cases commenced during that year, 28,105 applications for legal aid were granted, about
6.4% See ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE DE LA FRANCE 1968, supra note 59, at 129-30. As for
Germany, a proportion of about 20% was indicated in 1958 by Kaplan, von Mehren &:
Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure II, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1443, 1469 (1958). The
same proportion was found for the Land Baden-Wiirttemberg in 1958 by Heimerich,
supra note IOI, at 1072, and by Koebel, Zivilrichter und Armenrecht, 17 NEUE JURIS•
TISCHE WocHENSCHRIFr 392 (1964). Based on data from the German Federal Ministry of
Justice, we have found the following proportions between the number of civil cases
and the number of parties given legal aid before the Landgerichte for the year 1968:
Land Hamburg, 23.6%; Land Bremen, 22.8% Nordrhein-Westfalen, 16%; Hessen, 12.3%:
.Baden-Wiirttemberg, 11.2%; Bayem, 13.2%; Berlin, 18.5%, The proportions are lower
for cases before the Amtsgerichte: Hamburg, 6.6%: Bremen, 8.6%: Nordrhein-Westfalen,
6.9%; Hessen, 6.1%: Baden-Wiirttemberg, 6.9%: Bayern, 11,4%, This is certainly due, at
least in part, to the fact that it is not necessary to be represented by a lawyer before
these lower courts, and in practice representation of both parties by a lawyer occurs in
less than 30% of the cases. See Anlage zur Stellungnahme, supra note 47, at 161.
105. It seems as though little has changed since Ovid wrote: "Curia pauperibus
clausa est." Ovm, AMORES, lib. III, VIII, 55.
106. Kaplan, van Mehren &: Schaefer, supra note 104, at 1464. The proportion of
4,1% was calculated for cases of 1,000,000 DM (about $270,000); that of 54% for ca5e!
involving 100 DM (about $27).

April 1971]

Civil Procedure in Europe

873

gives the following figures for Spain: 107 in a typical big case involving 24,000,000 pesetas, the incidence of the costs upon the parties
is about six per cent; in small cases, typically poor people cases, it is
from fifty to eighty per cent. The sad conclusion of our Spanish colleague is that, "[i]n the majority of cases, justice is a luxury which is
not accessible to the proletariat."108 Team research recently conducted in Italy provides even more startling information.109 While in
large cases the average incidence of costs upon the parties is as low
as 8.4 per cent, the figures rise to between fifty-one and sixty per
cent in cases of less than 1,600 dollars; they jump to 170 per cent in
cases of less than 160 dollars--clearly an unbearable economic burden. Indeed, this very fact is borne out by the official statistics, which
show a tremendous diminution of small claim litigation in the last
seventy years. In the courts of the justices of the peace (conciliatori)
there were nearly two million cases per year at the turn of the century; in recent years, the average has plummeted to below 50,000
per year,11° while the population has nearly doubled. 111 To be sure,
the turn of the century was not a period of great social concern in
Italy. On the contrary, welfare and other social interventions by the
state in the economy have greatly increased since then. Why, then,
this shocking, dangerous, and regrettable diminution of accessibility of civil justice to the poor?
The final answer, I believe, may only be given by the economists
and sociologists. It is my guess that in a society in which the economic
and social changes during the last quarter of a century have by far
surpassed changes that had occurred in the course of many generations, the machinery of civil and commercial justice, if it is not
radically, revolutionarily modernized and changed, is doomed to
explode. Defects not only remain; they grow geometrically more
aggravating. And it is indeed little wonder that those who are systematically excluded from the official justice are turning to violent
methods of self-help.
As you see, our survey of modem trends of reform has brought us
to another urgent and immense need for change that is typical of our
epoch-and certainly not in Europe alone. It is the need for greater
107. See de Miguel, Los costos 'Y las costas en el proceso civil espanol, 1969 REvlsTA
901, 928-33.
108. Id. at 933.
109. See C. CASTELLANO, C. PACE&: G. PALOMBA, L'EFFICIENZA DELLA CIUmZIA ITALIAN.\

DE DERECHO PROCESAL IBEROAMERICANA

5!1-86, esp. 64-73 (Bari: Laterza. 1968).
110. See C. CAST.EI.LANO, C. PACE &: G. PALOMBA, supra note 109, at 82-83.
111. See s. CLOUGH, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN ITALY 381 (New York:
Columbia University Press. 1964).
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social justice. The need is felt-and the trend is apparent. Of course,
conditions are very different from one area to another; they are worse
in Spain and Italy than in Germany or France, as they are worse in
Germany and France than in Sweden. Yet, they were also very bad in
Sweden only two or three generations ago. The difference is one of
timing, not of trend. In Italy, for instance, after a stagnation of more
than one century, a bill for a far-reaching reform of the legal aid
system is finally under discussion in Parliament,112 as a result, in part,
of the pressure of constitutional requirements.113 The bill provides
for a national public fund to compensate the private practitioners
who assist indigent persons-a form of social "judi-care." Elsewhere
on the Continent, too, reformist zeal is growing in connection with
this and other social aspects of civil justice.114 Since 1949, England,
perhaps more than any other country, has become the model generally looked to by European reformers in the field of legal aid,ms although Europeans are well aware also of the tremendous strides in
this field made in contemporary America.116
V.

DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST EUROPE

Since extreme social injustice was one of the major factors leading
to the Russian Revolution of 1917, it seems appropriate to discuss
briefly those countries of Eastern Europe, which, after the "great
112. Bill No. 323, submitted to the Senate by the Minister of Justice on Nov. 19,
1968, still under discussion. For an appraisal see Cappelletti, supra note 99, at 51-59;
Denti, A proposito di riforma del gratuito patrncinio, 94 FORO ITALIANO V, 132 (1969).
The bill was approved by the Senate in March 1971, but still needs the approval of

the Chamber of Deputies.
113. See note 77 supra.
114. See, e.g., J • .ABEILLE, supra note 102, at 57-58; P. FROTIER DE LA MESsELltRE, supra
note 98, at 144, 146; Baur, supra note 38, at 445-51; Baur, Sozialer Ausgleich durch
Richterspruch, 1957 JURISTENZEITUNG 193-97; de Miguel, supra note 107; Fechner, supra
note 84, at 352-53; Heimerich, supra note IOI, at 1071-74; Henke, supra note 48, at 158•
62. The French Minister of Justice recently emphasized the urgent need for reform of
the legal aid system. See Le Monde, Feb. 17, 1970, at 15, cols. 5-6.
115. The English legal-aid program was inaugurated by the Legal Aid and Advice
Act of 1949, 12 &: 13 Geo. 6, c. 51. For American commentary on the success of the
system see, e.g., Pelletier, English Legal Aid: The Successful Experiment in Judicare, 40
U. CoLO. L. R.Ev. IO (1967); Utton, The British Legal Aid System, 76 YALE L.J. 371
(1966). British commentary on the system, however, has frequently been critical. See,
e.g., A. PATERSON, A Rl:PORT ON LEGAL Am AS A SoCIAL SERVICE 21-26 (London: Cobden
Trust. 1970); SOClETY OF LABOUR LAWYERS, JUSTICE FOR ALI. (Fabian Research Series
273. London: Fabian Society. 1968).
116. Of particular importance has been the rapid growth of neighborhood law
offices. See Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the
Poor, 80 HARV. L. REv. 805 (1967). There has been a great deal of discussion in England
about the advisability of instituting a similar program of neighborhood law offices. Of
particular interest are SOCIETY OF LABOUR LAWYERS, supra note 115, at 37-49; Liell,
Why Not Neighborhood Law Offices?, Ill SoucrroRS' J. 763 (1967).
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schism" alluded to before, now form the new "legal family" of
Socialist law.
To a certain degree, pre-1917 Russia as well as pre-World War II
Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and, to an even greater degree, all of
the other nations that now form the Marxist-Socialist part of Europe
were but a part of that major legal family called the Civil Law.117
Up to the October Revolution in Russia, and to the end of World
War II in the People's Democracies, our earlier story applies, then, to
all of these nations. The 1864 Russian Code of Civil Procedure, as
well as the 1865 Code of Rumania, were strongly influenced by the
French Code; 118 the Hungarian Code of 1911, as well as the later
codes of Yugoslavia and Poland, were modeled on the German and
particularly the Austrian codes of the end of the last century.119 In
Eastern Europe too, then, the story is that of a reaction against the
jus commune type of procedure, and recourse to "orality," immediacy, concentration, free evaluation of evidence-in other words, a
move toward more simplicity, spontaneity, rapidity, and efficiency in
the administration of civil justice. The sparse data available seem to
confirm, at least for the twentieth century codifications, a certain
success in achieving these goals. 120
Unfortunately, data concerning pre-revolutionary Russia have
been out of my reach. In particular, I have no concrete statistical
proof to confirm my general impression that civil procedure, based
on the Russian Code of 1864, was far from successful. What we do
know, however, is demonstrative enough. The centuries old tradition in Czarist Russia included two significant characteristics. On
the one hand, there was a sharp differentiation between law, particularly the ·written law, which was accessible only to a minor
elite, and custom, which was in force among the bulk of the populaII7. See, e.g., R. DAVID &: J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WoRLD TODAY
229-30 (London: Stevens &: Sons. 1968).
Il8. See 1 V. GsovsKI, SoVIEr CIVIL LAW 856 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Law School. 1948); Ionasco, Procedure orale et procedure ecrite dans le proces civil en
Roumanie, in :t.TUDF.S JURIDIQUF.S 105, 108 (:t.ditions de l'Academie de la Republique
Socialiste de Roumanie 1970).
II9. See notes 39, 42, and 43 supra and accompanying text.
120. This success seems to be illustrated by the duration of civil proceedings in
pre-World War II Czechoslovakia. For instance, in 1936, 74.4% and 44.9% of civil
proceedings in the lower and the higher courts of first instance respectively were
terminated within six months. (Statistics provided by the Czechoslovakian Ministry of
Justice through the courtesy of Dr. V. Steiner). Note that the Austrian Code of
1895 and the Hungarian Code of 1911 remained in force after 1918 in the two parts
of the new state of Czechoslovakia which had belonged previously to Austria and
Hungary. See Weiss, Das tschechoslowakische Zivilprozessrecht, in DER ZIVILPROZESS IN
DEN EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND IHREN KoLONIEN, supra note 39, at 251, 252.
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tion. 121 On the other hand, the official, centralized, feudalized
machinery of state and justice was totally extraneous-indeed, even
hostile-to the people, both in the countryside and the towns.122
Hence, the great explosion, with its profound repercussions even in
our apparently so technical subject-civil procedure.
Understandably, the first field of procedural reform was that of
the courts' personnel. Indeed, transforming the rules of procedure
would have had little social and ideological significance without a
change in the judge's social background. Thus, the reformers decided
to have judges elected popularly and for limited terms, although under the "guidance" of the omnipotent Communist party; 123 to provide for participation of lay- judges in deciding both the facts and the
law; 124 first to abolish, and then to reorganize on a "collective" basis
the bar (Advokatura); 125 finally-and here again the authoritarian
character unfortunately prevails over the social aim-to give full
powers of intervening in, and even initiating, civil cases to the
mighty bureaux of the Prokuratura126 (which might be translated as
the Office of the State Attorney).
Next came reform in the field of procedure proper: abolishing
the monopoly of the private parties and their counsel in conducting
121. See R. DAVID AND J. BRIERLEY, supra note 117, at 135-37.
122. Feodor Dostoevsky incisively described this situation in his first novel, PooR
FOLK (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1927). After waiting many years in misery for the
decision of his suit to collect a debt from a merchant, Gorsckov, one of the novel's
characters, could not survive the excitement of the long delayed victory.
123. For a short survey covering the various Socialist nations, which have all
adopted similar principles, see Cieslak, La participation des dtoyens a l'administration
de la justice dans les pays socialistes, in 27 REcuEILS DE LA Soc1Eri: JEAN BODIN:
GouvERNES ET GouvERNANTS 45, 90-95 (Bruxelles: Editions de la Librairie Encyclopedique. 1965). For the Soviet Union especially, see JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE
USSR 27•29 (R. Conquest ed. London: The Bodley Head. 1968) [hereinafter R. CON•
QUEST]; Barry &: Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 HARV. L. REv. I, 20·24 (1968);
Tchikvadze, Socialist Legality in the U.S.S.R., in LE CONCEPT DE LA LEGALITE DANS LES
PAYS socIALISTES 203, 233 (Warszawa: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich. 1961).
124. See, e.g., R. CONQUEST, supra note 123, at 29-32; Cieslak, supra note 123, at 45100; Tchikvadze, supra note 123, at 234; Timar, The Participation of Lay Judges in
Civil Proceedings and the Change in the Direction of the National Economy (in Rus•
sian), in 10 ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS SclENTIARUM BUDAPESTINENSIS DE ROLANDO Eorvos
NOMINATAE, SEcno lURIDICA: COLLOQUIUM INTERNATIONALE PROCESSUS CIVILIS 259-68
(Budapest 1969).
125. See, e.g., R. CONQUEST, supra note 123, at 32-39; Barry &: Berman, supra note
123, at 8-17; Friedman &: Zile, Soviet Legal Profession: Recent Developments in Law
and Practice, 1964 WIS. L. REv. 32, 33-39.
126. See, e.g., arts. 4 (2), 12, 41 of the 1964 Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR); arts. 14, 29, 44 para. 2 of the 1962 Basic
Principles of Civil Procedure of the Soviet Union (for the English translations see
notes 131 and 133, infra); H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 239 (New York: Random
House. 1963); R. CONQUEST, supra note 123, at 40-46; Wengerek, Die Grundlagen des
Zivilprozessrechts in Polen, 1968 JUIUSTENZEITUNG 647, 648.

April 1971]

Civil Procedure in Europe

877

civil litigation;127 establishing firmly the power as well as the duty of
the judge, in addition to the Prokuratura, to search for the "objective
truth" behind and beyond the allegations of the parties; 128 requiring
the court to assume the role of "assisting" and "advising" the parties,
particularly those not represented by counsel; 129 finally, placing
strong emphasis on the "mass education" character of civil proceed•
ings, which are to be "celebrated" in public, possibly in the factory,
the kolkhoz, or the dwelling where comrades and neighbors of the
litigants may be induced to attend. 130
These, then, are the general characteristics of Soviet civil procedure as they are reflected in the 1923 and 1964 codes for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,131 in the codes of the other
127. See, e.g., arts. 4 (3), 14, 34 para. 2, 50 para. 2, 195, 292 para. 2, 293 para. 2, 294,
320, ll40 para. 3, 407 of the 1964 Code of Civil Procedure of the RSFSR; arts. 16, 30, 33 of
the 1962 Basic Principles of Civil Procedure of the Soviet Union; H. BERMAN, supra note
126, at 309; Gurvic &: Gherzon, Le "Norme fondamentali" del diritto processuale civile
dell'U.R.S.S. e delle Repubbliche dell'Unione, 17 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITI0 E
P.R0CEDURA CIVILE 1624 (1963); Pecori, Quelques aspects de la nouvelle procedure civile
de la Rt!publique socialiste federative sovit!tique de Russie, 20 REvuE INTERNATIONALE
DE DROIT COMPARE 317, 323-33 (1968); Roggemann, Das Sowjetische Zivilverfahrensrecht,
12 OSTEUROPA·RECHT 229, 252-55 (1966). For the application of these principles in the
People's Democracies see, e.g., Gwiazdomorski & Cieslak, La preuve judiciaire dans les
pays socialistes a l't!poque contemporaine, in 19 RECUEII.S DE LA Soc1trt JEAN BoDIN: LA
PREUVE 49, 7!1-82 (Bruxelles: Librairie Encyclopedique. 1963); Jodlowski, Les principes de
la procedure civile polonaise, 12 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DR0IT COMPARE 369, 376-81
(1960); N<!vai, The Authority of the Judge in Conducting Proceedingt. Under the

Hungarian Law of Civil Procedure, in STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE SIXTH INTER•
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 79 (Budapest: Publishing House of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 1962); N<!vai, La procedure civile hongroise apres la
seconde guerre mondiale, 1968 ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT DE LIEGE 137, 148-55
(La Haye: Nijhoff.); Wengerek, Les changements apportes ci la procedure civile en
Pologne par le code de procedure civile de 1961, in ETUDES SUR LE DROIT POLONAIS
ACTUEL 165, 172-76 (Paris-La Haye: Mouton. 1968).
128. See, e.g., arts. 14 para. l, 50 para. 2, 56 of the 1964 Code of the RSFSR and
art.,. 16 para. I, 19 of the 1962 Basic Principles; A. TROUSSOV, INTRODUCTION A LA
THEOR!E DE LA PREUVE JUD!CIAIRE 12-20 (Moscou: Editions en langues <!trangeres. No date);
Gwiazdomorski &: Cieslak, supra note 127, at 69-73; Kietz, Die Grundprinzipien des
Zivilprozesses der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, in DAS ZIVILPROZESSRECHT DER
DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK 18, 22-33 (H. Nathan ed. Berlin: Veb Deutscher
Zentralverlag. 1957); Nevai, The Authority, supra note 127, at 86-90; Tchikvadze, supra
note 123, at 234; Wengerek, supra note 126, at 649.
129. See, e.g., art. 14 para. 2, of the 1964 Code of the RSFSR; art. 16 para. 2, of the
1962 Basic Principles; J. HAZARD, SETILING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SOCIETY 403-05, 456-63
(New York: Columbia University Press. 1960); Kellner, Die miindliche Verhandlung,
24 NEUE Jusnz 170 (1970).
130. See, e.g., art. 2 para. 2, of the 1964 Code of the RSFSR; art. 2 para. 2, of the
1962 Basic Principles; H. BERMAN, supra note 126, at 83, 308-09; DAVID, Les donnees
fondamentales du droit sovietique, in I R. DAVID &: J. HAZARD, LE DROIT SovIETIQUE
206·1 l (Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias. 1954); Piischel, Zivilprozess und Zivilprozessrecht,
in DAS ZIVILPROZESSRECHT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK, supra note 128,
at 4-6; Tchikvadze, supra note 123, at 235-36.
llll. The RSFSR, centering around Moscow, is by far the most important and most
populous of the Soviet Union's Republics. The 1923 Code is translated into English in
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Soviet Republics,182 as well as in the Union's Basic Principles of Civil
Procedure of 1962.188 With noteworthy but not overly impressive
variations, in the past twenty-five years these have also become the
general characteristics of civil procedure in the other European countries of the Communist orbit184-although I should immediately add
that, in many respects, in most of these countries the changes in the
field of civil procedure have not been quite so revolutionary as in
Russia. In fact, the Austrian Code, imitated in most of those countries' pre-war legislation, had already provided that the judge be
very active in controlling and speeding up litigation and be concerned with his role in "assisting" and "educating" the economically
and intellectually weaker party. Franz Klein's definition of civil procedure as a Wohlfahrtseinrichtung, an institution for the collective
welfare, is well known.135
About how all of this, old and new, actually works today in
Eastern Europe, I know too little.136 Of course, the impression of an
2 V. GsovsKI, SOVIET C1vIL LAw 553-640 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law
School. 1949); the 1964 Code is translated into English in 11 LAW IN EA.STERN EUROPE:
THE CIVIL CODE AND THE CoDE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR 1964 (A. Kiralfy
transl. Leyden: Sijthoff. 1966).
132. As a prominent Soviet proceduralist informs us, the 1964 Code of Civil
Procedure of the RSFSR was the first to be compiled and has served as the model for
the codes of the other republics of the Soviet Union. As a result, differences among
the various codes are minimal. See Gurvic, La nuova legislaz.ione processuale civile
nell'URSS, 22 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITIO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 710, 714 (1968). The
same was true for the Code of 1923. See Gsovski, The Soviet Union, in 1 GOVERNMENT,
LAw AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EAsTERN EUROPE 1, 15 0/· Gsovski &:
K. Grzybowski eds. London: Stevens & Sons. 1959).
133. The 1962 Principles, providing a binding guideline for all the Union Republics,
is translated into English in 7 LAw IN EAsTERN EUROPE: MISCELLANEA 299-317 (Leyden:
Sijthoff. 1963).
134. See, e.g., M. CAPPELLETII, Interrogatorio della parte e principii fondamentali
del processo civile nell'Europa comunista, in PRoCESSo E IDEOLOGIE, supra note 103,
at 35-98.
135. See, e.g., F. KLEIN, ZEIT- UND GEISTESSTROMUNGEN IM PROZESSE, 25, 26, 29 (Frankfurt a. M: Klostermann. 2d ed. 1958) (a lecture given in 1901); F. KLEIN &: F. ENGEL,
supra note 36, at 191-95 and passim; Satter, supra note 38, at 272. See generally Baur,
supra note 38, at 445-53; Malaniuk, Die Stellung des Richters und die Prozessreform,
in FES"I5CHRIFT ZUR FiiNFZIGJAHRFEIER, supra note 55, at 175-200. See note 3S supra and
accompanying text.
136. Regarding the problem of duration of civil cases, I owe to the courtesy of
Professors V. Steiner of Prague, H. Kellner of East Berlin, E. Wengerek of Poznan, and
J. Stalev of Sofia, the following official statistics:
In Czechoslovakia, in 1968 the average duration for civil proceedings in courts of
first instance was: 48.8% terminated with a final judgment within three months; 25.4%
between three and six months; 16.7% between six months and one year, 6.8% between
one and two years; and 2.3% lasted more than two years.
In East Germany the figures for 1969 concerning ordinary civil proceedings of first
instance, excluding summary ex parte proceedings and family law matters, were as
follows: (1) before the Kreisgerichte, 76.9% of the cases were terminated within three
months; 14.1% between three and six months; 9% took more than six months; (2)
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inquisitorial, authoritarian, or, at best, paternalistic system of civil
litigation, with all its dangers of abuse, is not easily avoided. No
doubt, true social justice should be an instrument to enhance, not
to trample on, the individual's liberties. However, I do know enough
of how the Western systems work in practice. The possibility of justice being unavailable under a strictly adversarial system of litigation
has become apparent enough in the Western world137 to make easy
the prophecy that, without prompt and deep social changes, more
and more mass social explosions will occur.

ACTIVE ROLE FOR THE JUDGE
At least in its conception of a more active role for the judge, the
radical Communist solution, excessive and illiberal as it has only too
often proved to be, nevertheless appears to be in the mainstream of
a great current of legal thought and a powerful trend of procedural reform, which both have their roots within138 as well as outside the Old Continent. We must have the courage to admit this fact
--and to admit that this is perhaps one of the major converging
trends between East and West, a trend evident even in the United
States.
When in 1906 an "obscure young professor of law at Nebraska"
delivered an address to the American Bar Association entitled The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
VI.

TOWARD A MORE

before the Bezirksgerichte, 44,4% were terminated within three months; 11.1 % between three and six months; 44.5% took more than six months. The figures for the
preceding five years were about the same.
In Poland, during the years 1963-1967, the average duration of proceedings of first
instance before the District Courts (which, according to article 16 of the Polish Code
of Civil Procedure, have broad general jurisdiction) was between 3.1 and 3.7 months.
In Bulgaria, in 1969, only 9.5% and 8.3% of the civil proceedings of first instance
before the People's Courts and the Provincial Courts, respectively, required more than
three months for completion. The figures for the preceding three years were similar.
137. This is so not only on the Old Continent. In the words of a noted
American scholar: "It is doubtless true that the theory of our adversary system is
attractive in statement ••• , but it seldom fits the facts in modem litigation. If it were
to operate perfectly, both parties would have the same opportunities and capacities
for investigation, including the resources to finance them, equal facilities for producing
all the discoverable materials, equal good or bad fortune with reference to availability
of witnesses and preservation of evidence, and equal persuasive skill in the presentation
of evidence and argument. The case is rare where there is even approximate equality
in these respects. • • ." E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYsrEM: OF LmGA.TION 34 (New York: Columbia University Press. 1956). Also
see F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 7 (Boston: Little, Brown. 1965) ("Anything that the law
of procedure or the judge's role can do to equalize opportunity and to put a faulty
presentation on the right track so that disputes are more likely to be settled on their
merits, will in the long run bolster up rather than destroy the adversary system, and
will increase the moral force of decisions').
138. See note 38 supra and accompanying text (Austria and Germany); note 59
supra (France). For a comparative survey see Habscheid, note 88 supra.
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the reaction of his audience was "a huge storm of indignation. Indeed, the first result of Dean Pound's indictment was that most of
the morning's business session the next day was given over to speeches
by various leaders of the bar upholding the existing procedures as
'the most refined and scientific system ever devised by the wit of man'
and vilifying Pound's address as an attempt to destroy that which the
wisdom of the centuries had built up." 139 Pound had the audacity to
attack mercilessly that sanctuary of Anglo-American law which he
contemptuously called "the sporting theory of justice"140-the acceptance "as a matter of course that a judge should be a mere umpire, ...
and that the parties should fight out their own game in their own way
without judicial interference"; 141 he challenged "the idea that
procedure must of necessity be wholly contentious" and that the
judge "is merely to decide the contest, as counsel present it, •.. not
to search independently for truth and justice."142
What in 1906 could still appear as a scandalous and unjustified
indictment, however, is today but a broadly accepted truth. As Judge
Irving R. Kaufman said at a seminar of prominent American judges
and lawyers in 1961, "our current emphasis on early judicial intervention is ... the culmination of the efforts of many of our greatest
legal thinkers to induce the judges to ... take an active part in the
control of litigation .... Contrary to what most of us have accepted
as gospel, a purely adversarial system, uncontrolled by the judiciary,
is not an automatic guarantee that justice will be done." 148 Of
course, Americans still have a long way to go in this direction, especially if it is even partly true, as Judge Kaufman asserted nine years
ago and the Chief Justice of the United States reiterated as recently
as August 10, 1970, that in many respects "the similarities are still
striking" between the situation in 1906 and the present day situation.144 Yet, many European and other civil-law countries, particu139. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Efjective Judicial Supervision over Litigation, 29
F.R.D. 207, 208-09 (1962).
140. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 8 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 14, 24-25 (1956) (previously published in 40 AM. L. R. 729
(1906)).
141. Id. at 14.
142. Id. at 14-15.
143. Kaufman, supra note 139, at 208, 211.
144. Id. at 210; Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 9l!l! (1970).
Chief Justice Burger states: "If you will read Pound's speech, you will see at once that
we did not heed his warning, and today, in the final third of this century, we are still
trying to operate the courts with fundamentally the same basic methods, the same
procedures and the same machinery he said were not good enough in 1906." Id. at
929.
One recent attempted reform in which American proceduralists placed great hope
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larly in the Latin areas of Europe and America where the Austrian
model of a socially concerned judicial activism has not yet been implemented, have an even longer way to go in this universal quest
for effective, accessible, and truly democratic justice.
To be sure, procedure and procedural techniques are not the
only tools in this quest. Reforms outside the field of procedure are of
primary importance. But as long as an adversarial system of litigation
provides a privileged position for the economically stronger party,
social reforms limited to substantive law are insufficient. For example, socially progressive labor law is well developed in Italy; yet
labor proceedings, with their unbearable duration, put the economically weaker party at a disadvantage. 145 As in the field of substantive
law, so in that of procedure the better way to meet the challenge of
our time is not by sticking to old laissez-/aire schemes, but rather by
trying to reconcile private initiative with an appropriate degree of
official control.
The final comment on this problem can be that of Dean Charles
W. Joiner: "'No one wants to be a radical.' Few lawyers wish to be
so characterized, yet procedure reform and honest appraisal demand
radicals. " 146
VII.

PROCEDURE AND !DEOLOGIES

"Prophecies," politics, ideologies: what has all this to do, one
might ask, with civil procedure? This question leads us to my last
point.
Indeed, civil procedure has traditionally been considered a very
technical branch of the law-the technical branch par excellence;
and as a mere technique it has usually been studied and taught. Only
too rarely have its ideological foundations, its philosophical background, its socio-political impact been analyzed. 147
was the pretrial conference as a means of judicial activism in the conduct of proceedings. These hopes have been, in part, disappointed. See M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 28-70 (New York: Columbia University Press.
1964). This failure of the pretrial conference is not surprising to a European observer; it was simply the wrong institution. In those European countries where the
intervention of the judge in the conduct of proceedings has proved to be successful
(Austria, Sweden, etc.), the fundamental institution for this intervention has been
conference between the judge and the parties (assisted, but not substituted, by their
lawyers). See, e.g., R. GINSBURG &: A. BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 244 &: n.115
(The Hague: Nijhoff. 1965).
145. See, e.g., Cappelletti, Il processo come fenomeno sociale di massa, 25 IL PONTE
1234, 1236 (1969).
146. Joiner, Lawyer Attitudes Toward Law and Procedural Reform, 50 JUDICATURE
23, 27 (1966). See Wright, supra note 83, at 574.
147. For an effort in this direction, ace M. CAl'l'.ELLE'ITI, supra note 103.
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Such an analysis, however, is indispensable once the proceduralist
becomes aware that no legal technique is an end in itself, none
is ideologically neutral. Take, for instance, the "formal," numerical
system of proof. Not only was it a reflection and a crystallization in
the field of procedure of a hierarchically structured, nonegalitarian
society-the superiority of the nobleman, the clergyman, the rich,
over the commoner, the layman, the poor148-but it was also a direct
reflection and a legal imposition of an a priori, scholastic method
of thinking. This method based the discovery of facts not on concrete observation and empirical case-by-case evaluation of factual
and evideµtial phenomena, but on abstract premises once and for
all accepted as "absolutes," from which the "truth" had to be derived in a mechanical way.149 This was the mentality-the Ptolemaic
method of thinking-of the epoch; it was faithfully mirrored in
the courts.
Everybody knows of the great intellectual revolution that, led by
such pioneer spirits as Galilei, Bacon, and Newton, introduced
what we now call the modern era in human thinking, characterized by the primacy of observation, of trial and error methodology
-in sum, the scientific method as opposed to the dogmatic and
scholastic one. This revolution, too, is reflected in the law of procedure and evidence. As the beliefs of the man of science are, in the
words of Bertrand Russell, "tentative, not dogmatic; they are based
on evidence, not on authority," 150 so are those of the modern judge.
When Voltaire inveighed against some of the basic rules of the formal system of proof still prevailing in his time, exclaiming that "it
is for the judges to weigh the value of the testimony" and the witnesses' sincerity,151 the new common sense was speaking through
him. And so was the new common sense guiding Napoleon when he
attacked another of the old basic rules. He found it unacceptable
that one honest man's testimony could not be received as evidence,
148. See note 11 supra and accompanying text,
149. For instance, one "absolute" affirmed by Thomas Aquinas himself was that
"muller est minoris virtutis et dignitatis quam vir" (women are of lesser virtue and
dignity than men); hence, the exclusion of women from giving evidence, or their
lesser weight as witnesses. See 2 G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 430. Other basic rules of
the numerical system of proof derived their purported absolute character from
sacred texts. Thus, the rule that excluded the testimony of one single witness and
the rule that considered two uncontradicted witnesses to be full proof binding on the
court were based on passages in the Bible. See, e.g., 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at
242-43, esp. n.6.
150. B. RUSSELL, HlsTORY OF WF.STERN PHILOSOPHY 514 (London: Allen 8: Unwin.
1961).
151. F. DE VOLTAIRE, Prix de la justice et de l'humanitt! art. 22, § 4, in 29 0.EUVJlES
COMPLETES 337 (Imprimerie de la Societe litteraire-typographique. 1785).
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while that of two rascals ("deux coquins") had to be accepted as full
proof.1112 Indeed, the formal system of proof was soon to collapsein France first, and then elsewhere. Common sense cannot be kept
out of the courts for too long.
And so it is with all of the other aspects of procedure. Take, as
another example, the relationship between the individual and the
authorities. Secrecy of civil and, even more so, criminal proceedings
was clearly a manifestation of oppressive authoritarianism. It
necessarily came under heavy attack during the liberal European
revolution that swept through the Old Continent from the end
of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth. Two
significant results were the abolition in revolutionary France of
the secret character of the taking of testimonial evidence and the
proclamation of publicity and orality of proceedings as fundamental
rights of man in the principal constitutional documents stemming
from the uprisings of 1848-1849.153
So it is also with the relationship of the individual to society. The
last two or three decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the
incipient decline, on the one hand, of laissez-faire conceptions in the
organization of society, and the emergence, on the other hand, of
new labor organizations as political forces. This development marked
the commencement of social and welfare legislation in the more
progressive nations, evidenced, once more, by the Austrian Code of
1895 with its conception of civil procedure as an educational tool
and an institution for social welfare,154 an idea which had a deep
influence on the modern legislation of other countries. Moreover,
whereas nineteenth century individualism was manifest in the conception of civil procedure as a private affair of the parties-Privatsache der Parteien155-the movement toward a more active in152. See F. G0RPHE, L'Al'PRECIATION DES PREUVES EN JUSTICE 35 (Paris: Sirey. 1947);
WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 256 n.3.
153. On the Revolutionary abolition of the principe du secret de l'enquete, see
note 24 supra and accompanying text. On orality and publicity of proceedings, both
criminal and civil, proclaimed in the Declaration of Fundamental Rights by the
National Assembly at Frankfurt in December 1848 and in the Reichsverfassung of
March 1849, see, e.g., R. SCHMIDT, I.EHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 104-05
(Leipzig: Duncker 8e Humblot. 2d ed. 1906).
In pre-Revolutionary France, the campaign against secrecy of procedure (particularly in criminal cases) as a manifestation of oppressive authoritarianism was led
by Voltaire. See J. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 376-77.
154. See note 135 supra, and accompanying text.
155. This conception, already affirmed in the French Code de procedure civile of
1806, was also basic to the Italian Code of 1865 and to the German Code of 1877. See,
e.g., M. CAPPELLE'lTI 8e J. PERILLO, supra note I, at 41; H. DE l300R, EINZEI.RICHTER UND
KOLLEGIUM IM ITALIENISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESS 13, 61 (Gottingen: Schwartz.
1953); R. Morel, supra note IO, at 7-8, 344-46. For later changes in Germany and France,
see notes 38 and 59, supra.
7
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volvement of the judge in controlling litigation reflects the growing
pressure for public intervention in private life which is a feature of
our epoch. Indeed, this renewed clash between the adversarial and
the inquisitorial approaches to litigation is but one aspect of the
major challenge of our time: to reconcile private freedom with social
justice. Of course, it is with the Communist Revolution that these
developments have been brought to striking proportions. The basic
ideology of the Revolution proclaims the abolition of private economic rights. As Lenin affirmed in 1922: "We acknowledge nothing
as 'private.' For us everything in the province of economics is in the
domain of public law and not of private law.'' 156 Traditionally, however, the contents of civil litigation had been and, in the Western
world, still are "in the province of economics" and, more generally,
of "private law." The sweeping movement to make that province
"public" in the Communist states, then, is clearly the ideological
foundation of all those radical-and, in our eyes, probably excessive
--changes in the field of Socialist civil procedure of which we spoke
before. The movement also explains further phenomena which cannot be analyzed here, such as the sharp reduction of the sphere of
civil procedure proper.157
And so it is finally with the relationship between the state
and the international communities of nations. In this area we notice
a growing international openness in the trend toward more liberal
recognition of foreign values, both on the legislative and the judicial
levels. This is reflected in civil procedure as a new spirit in the
application of foreign law158 and the recognition of foreign judg156. THE I.Aw OF THE Sov!Er STATE 76 (A.Y. Vyshinsky ed. New York: Macmillan.
4th printing 1961).
157. This reduction is understandable given the transfer of a great portion of
those private economic relationships that in the West are the most frequent subject
matter of civil procedure to the sphere of the state economy, in which organs other
than the ordinary courts have jurisdiction. One aspect of this development is the
institution of state arbitration bodies to settle economic disputes between organizations holding cooperative or state property. See, e.g., R. DAVID &: J. BRIERLEY, supra
note 117, at 187-93; Stalev, L'arbitrage d'Etat en Rt!publique populaire de Bulgarie, 9
REVUE DE DROIT CONTEMPORAIN 117 (1962-63).
158. This is true for both Europe and the United States. See Sass, Foreign Law in
Civil Litigation: A Comparative Survey, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 332, 365-71 (1968). "The
current trend in American jurisprudence is to discard the doctrine that foreign law
is fact, to have the court rather than the jury decide questions of foreign law, and
to permit the court to take judicial notice of the content of the law of foreign
nations. This trend continues notwithstanding the defense of the common law
methods of pleading and proving foreign law by several highly authoritative commentators." H. SMIT &: A. MILLER, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL AssISTANCE IN CIVIL
MATTERS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND THE UNITED
STATES 74 (Milan: Giuffre. 1961). See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.I (added Feb. 28, 1966). For
Europe, see generally the Symposium on DIE ANwENDUNG AUSLANDISCHEN REcHTS IM
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT, esp. at 33 (Berlin-Tiibingen: de Gruyter-Mohr. 1968):
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ments,1119 and as a changing mood in the international cooperation
in litigation. 160 Here, of course, reform is only beginning. The
international organizations still are in the initial stage. Their growth,
however, is in sight. It is bringing about a new international dimension even in the domestic courts of the member states.

VIII. THE PRoCEDURALIST's RoLE
I have given only a few examples of the close connection of civil
procedure with the intellectual and political apparatus of society, and
I could go on. But my time has run out, and I wish to conclude.
My conclusion is addressed to the subject that is the proceduralists' vital concern: the "science"-or simply the study-of civil
procedure.
Today, it is only too clear that the happy times are past when
procedural scholars could be content with a purely technical study of
local practices and rules. By now, we have discovered that, embodied
in those practices and rules, are the great waves of history: the socioeconomic as well as the intellectual changes, revolutions, and stagnations of history. We have also discovered the remarkable importance
of comparative studies as an approach to reform. Finally, we have
discovered-and I quote from Franz Klein-that "the squalid, arid,
Giuliano, Le traitement du droit t!tranger dans le proces civil dans les systemes
juridiques continentaux, 14 REVUE INTERNAnONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 5 (1962). For recent court developments in Italy see note 93 supra.
159. See notes 87, 93, 94 supra and accompanying text; M. CAPPELLE'ITI, EL VALOR DE
SENTENCIAS y DE LAS NORMAS EXTRANJERAS EN EL PROCESO CIVIL, esp. pt. I (Buenos
Aires: Ediciones Jurfdicas Europa-America. 1968).
In this context, the 1966 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters is also a progressive and
noteworthy contribution. See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 87, at 394-96; Nadelmann
lk von Mehren, The Extraordinary Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 60 AM. J. INTL. L. 803-06 (1966). Also significant is the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, concluded under the auspices of the United Nations and now ratified by the major
Continental countries (France, 1959; Germany, 1961; Italy, 1969). The text is reported,
and followed by comments by P. Sanders and M. Domke, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COM·
MERCIAL .ARBITRATION 277 (P. Sanders ed. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1960).
160. For a country-by-country survey of the various forms of assistance rendered
by one state in connection with judicial proceedings in another, see INTERNATIONAL
Co-oPERAnON IN LITIGATION: EUROPE (H. Smit ed. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1965). The
volume also covers recent legislative developments in the United States, including
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) and 28(b) (as amended Jan. 21, 1963). Id. at 409-64.
In this context, the 1964 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, as well as the 1968 Draft Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, should
also be noted. The two documents are reported in 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 620 (1964) and
16 AM. J. COMP, L. 594 (1968), respectively. See generally F. PoCAR, L'ASSISTENZA
GIUDIZIARIA INTERNAZIONALE IN MATEIUA CIVILE (Padova: Cedam. 1967).
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neglected phenomenon of civil procedure is in fact strictly connected
with the great intellectual movements of peoples; and that its varied
manifestations are among the most important documents of mankind's culture. " 161
Thus, the proceduralists' task has grown to enormous proportions.
We once considered ourselves the priests of a neutral science or art.
Now we have learned that history and political science, economics
and sociology have become necessary ingredients of our work. We
also once believed that law and procedure were the net product of
local and national situations. Now we have learned that an insulated
study of law and procedure, sealed within local and national
boundaries, does not correspond to the growing international dimension of our epoch.
The difficulty of such a task fills us with a sense of fear. What,
then, does our epoch demand of us?
The answer, however, is as simple as it is clear. We must definitely reject the traditional deceptions that are not worthy of us, of
our students, of our readers. Procedure is not pure form. It is the
meeting point of conflicts, of policies, of ideas. It is the "Cape
Wrath" where Rapidity and Efficiency have to be combined with
Justice; it is also the "Cape of Good Hope" where Individual Liberty
has to be combined with Equality of Opportunities. Procedure is, in
fact, the faithful mirror of all of the major exigencies, problems,
and trials of our epoch-of the immense challenge of our time.
Here, my fellow proceduralists, is our challenge. Here is our
work.
161. F. KLEIN, supra note 135, at 8. See also P. CALAMANDREI, supra note 97, at 76
("••• the judicial process reflects the ••• structure of the state, just as a drop of water
reflects the sky").

